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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose and Scope 
The NASA Docking System (NDS) is NASA’s implementation for the emerging 
International Docking System Standard (IDSS) using low impact docking technology.  
The NASA Docking System Project (NDSP) is the International Space Station (ISS) 
Program’s project to produce the NDS, Common Docking Adapter (CDA) and Docking 
Hub.  The NDS design evolved from the Low Impact Docking System (LIDS).  The 
acronym international Low Impact Docking System (iLIDS) is also used to describe this 
system as well as the Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) project designing the 
NDS for the NDSP.  NDS and iLIDS may be used interchangeability.  This document 
will use the acronym iLIDS.  Some of the heritage documentation and implementations 
(e.g., software command names, requirement identification (ID), figures, etc.) used on 
NDS will continue to use the LIDS acronym. 
This specification defines the technical requirements for the iLIDS GFE delivered to the 
NDSP by the iLIDS project.  This document contains requirements for two iLIDS 
configurations, SEZ29101800-301 and SEZ29101800-302.  Requirements with the 
statement, “iLIDS shall”, are for all configurations.  Examples of requirements that are 
unique to a single configuration may be identified as “iLIDS (-301) shall” or “iLIDS (-302) 
shall”. Furthermore, to allow a requirement to encompass all configurations with an 
exception, the requirement may be designated as “iLIDS (excluding -302) shall”. 
Verification requirements for the iLIDS project are identified in the Verification Matrix 
(VM) provided in the iLIDS Verification and Validation Document, JSC-63966. 
The following definitions differentiate between requirements and other statements: 
Shall:   This is the only verb used for the binding requirements. 
Should/May:  These verbs are used for stating non-mandatory goals. 
Will:   This verb is used for stating facts or declaration of purpose. 
A “Definition of Terms” table is provided in Appendix B to define those terms with 
specific tailored uses in this document. 
1.2 Responsibility and Change Authority 
This document is prepared and maintained in accordance with EA-WI-023, Project 
Management of GFE Flight Projects.  The responsibility for the development of this 
document lies with the Systems Architecture and Integration Office (EA3).  The NDS 
Project Office will serve as the change authority. 
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2 APPLICABLE AND REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
2.1 Applicable Documents 
The following documents, of the exact issue and revision shown, form a part of this 
specification, to the extent specified herein. 
Table 2.1-1 - Applicable Documents  
Document 
Number 
Revision/ 
Release Date 
Document Title 
ANSI/TIA/EIA-
422B 
Rev. B 
16 Sep. 2005 
Electrical Characteristics of Balanced 
Voltage Digital Interface Circuits 
ANSI/TIA/EIA-
568-B.2 
Rev. B 
Apr. 2001 
Balanced Twisted-Pair Telecommunications 
Cabling and Components Standards 
IDSS IDD Rev. A 
13 May 2011 
International Docking System Standard 
(IDSS) Interface Definition Document (IDD) 
JPR 8080.5 Rev. A 
w/Change 1 
1 May 2009 
JSC Design and Procedural Standards 
JPR 8730.2 Baseline 
Mar. 2008 
JSC Fastener Integrity Testing Program 
JSC 28918 Baseline 
Feb. 2005 
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Design 
Requirements and Considerations 
JSC 62809 Rev. D 
22 Apr. 2010 
Human Rated Spacecraft Pyrotechnic 
Specification 
JSC 64598 Baseline 
Mar. 2011 
iLIDS Ionizing Radiation Control Plan 
JSC 64599 Draft 
Dec. 2010 
iLIDS Electric Power Quality Description 
Document 
JSC 64924-A Rev. A 
10 Aug. 2011 
iLIDS Electrical, Electronic and 
Electromechanical (EEE) Parts 
Management and Implementation Plan 
JSC 65795 Rev. D 
15 Mar. 2011 
NASA Docking System (NDS) Interface 
Definition Document (IDD) 
JSC 65842 Draft 
Mar. 2011 
iLIDS Electromagnetic, Environmental, 
Effects (E3) Description Document 
JSC 65970 Rev A. 
17 Jun. 2011 
iLIDS Thermal and Induced Environments 
Specification 
MIL-STD-
1553B 
Rev. B, 
Change 
Notice 2 
2 Sep. 1986 
Department of Defense Interface Standard 
for Digital Time Division 
Command/Response Multiplex Data Bus 
NASA-STD-
4003 
Baseline 
8 Sep. 2003 
Electrical Bonding for NASA Launch 
Vehicles, Spacecraft, Payloads, and Flight 
Equipment 
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Document 
Number 
Revision/ 
Release Date 
Document Title 
NASA-STD-
5005 
Rev. C 
13 Mar. 2009 
Standard for the Design and Fabrication of 
Ground Support Equipment  
NASA-STD-
5017 
Baseline 
13 Jun. 2006 
Design and Development Requirements for 
Mechanisms 
NASA-STD-
5019 
Baseline 
7 Jan. 2008 
Fracture Control Requirements for 
Spaceflight Hardware 
NASA-STD-
6016 
Baseline 
11 Jul. 2008 
Standard Material and Processes 
Requirements for Spacecraft 
NASA/TP-
2002-210780 
Baseline 
May 2002 
The New NASA Orbital Debris Engineering 
Model ORDEM2000 
PRC-9002 Rev. I 
Jun. 2010 
Process Specification for Part Marking 
SN-C-0005 Rev. D 
w/Change 13 
13 Feb. 2008 
Contamination Control Requirements 
SSP 30234 Rev. F, DCN 2 
Dec. 2008 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and 
Critical Items List Requirements for Space 
Station 
SSP 30309 Rev. F 
23 Oct. 2009 
Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment 
Requirements Document 
SSP 30425 Rev B 
8 Feb. 1994 
Space Station Program Natural 
Environment Definition for Design 
SSP 30559 Rev. D 
27 Jul. 2007 
Structural Design and Verification 
Requirements 
SSP 41172 Rev. AA 
8 Apr. 2010 
Qualification and Acceptance Environmental 
Test Requirements 
SSP 50005 Rev. E 
6 Jun. 2006 
International Space Station Flight Crew 
Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T) 
SSP 50021 Baseline with 
DCN 004 
22 Jul. 2009 
Safety Requirements Document 
SSP 50038 Rev. B 
17 Nov. 1995 
Computer-Based Control System Safety 
Requirements 
SSP 50254 Rev. N 
20 Mar. 2011 
International Space Station Program 
Operations Nomenclature 
SSQ 21655 Rev. G 
15 Feb. 2005 
Cable, Electrical, MIL-STD-1553 Databus, 
Space Quality, General Specification 
Webster's  Webster's New World Dictionary of 
American English 
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2.2 Reference Documents 
The following documents are reference documents utilized in the development of this 
specification. 
Table 2.2-1 - Reference Documents  
Document 
Number 
Revision/ 
Release Date 
Document Title 
EA-WI-023 Rev. E, DCN-
2 
Sep. 2010 
Project Management of Government 
Furnished Equipment (GFE) Flight Projects 
JSC-27301 Rev. F 
Aug. 2009 
Materials Control Plan for JSC Flight 
Hardware 
JSC-28533 Rev. F 
Jan. 2010 
International Space Station Catalogue of 
Intravehicular Activity (IVA) Government 
Furnished Equipment (GFE) Flight Crew 
Equipment (FCE) 
NPR 8705.2 Rev. B 
w/Change 1 
7 Dec. 2009 
Human Rating Requirements and 
Guidelines 
NSTS 07700 
Vol. X, Book 2 
Rev. M, 
w/Change No. 
256 
15 Jul. 2011 
Space Shuttle Flight and Control System 
Specification Volume X, Book 2 
SSP 30233 Rev. H 
21 Aug. 2007 
Space Station Requirements for Materials 
and Processes 
SSP 30426 Rev. D 
21 Jan. 1994 
Space Station External Contamination 
Control Requirements 
SSP 41000 Rev. BU 
30 Mar. 2011 
System Specification for the International 
Space Station 
SSP 41004 Rev. H 
25 Oct. 2005 
Common Berthing Mechanism to 
Pressurized Elements Interface Control 
Document Part 1 
2.3 Order of Precedence 
In the event of a conflict between the text of this specification and an applicable 
document cited herein, the text of this specification takes precedence except for JSC-
65795, International Low Impact Docking System (iLIDS) Interface Definition Document 
(IDD).  This document uses the following three methods to invoke requirements from 
applicable documents: 
• The requirement is written directly from the applicable document 
• The entire document is invoked as applicable 
• An entire document is invoked as applicable with cited exceptions 
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3 REQUIREMENTS 
3.1 International Low Impact Docking System General Requirements 
3.1.1 iLIDS GFE Description 
The iLIDS mating system supports low approach velocity docking and provides a 
modular and reconfigurable standard interface, supporting crewed and autonomous 
vehicles during mating and assembly operations. 
The iLIDS is an androgynous peripheral docking system.  It facilitates low approach 
velocity docking via a reconfigurable, active, closed-loop, force-feedback controlled 
mating system using modern technologies.  The iLIDS supports both crewed and 
autonomous vehicles during mating and assembly operations.  In addition, it is modular 
and reconfigurable for a variety of missions.  Future iLIDS configurations will be certified 
to allow docking at positive, zero, and negative approach velocities, as well as berthing. 
The iLIDS system establishes the initial contact of two vehicles through a Soft Capture 
System (SCS), which uses the low impact docking technology.  This system consists of 
guide petals, magnets, magnetic striker plates, electromechanical actuators in a Stewart 
Platform configuration, and load sensing rings.  During docking soft capture, the guide 
petals are the first to make contact, transferring contact/load inputs into the load sensing 
load cells.  The load cells provide information to drive the electromechanical actuators 
to correct lateral and angular misalignment between the two opposing interfaces.  Soft 
capture completes when electromagnetic attachment of the magnets to the striker 
plates on the opposing capture ring occurs. 
The hard capture subsystem uses powered hooks to engage with another iLIDS in 
passive mode, providing a structural connection ready for pressurization between the 
mated vehicles that allows for cargo and crew transfer.  The Hard Capture System 
(HCS) consists of a tunnel, 12 active/passive hook pairs, seals, and mechanized 
separation/umbilicals.  The docking is complete when mechanized resource transfer 
umbilicals are extended and engaged with the spring-load separation system energized 
for undocking. 
The iLIDS is a docking system that can be commanded via iLIDS electronics interface 
from the host vehicle in either an active mode or a passive mode.  Active mode is when 
the iLIDS commands the soft capture and all sequences of docking.  Passive mode is 
when the iLIDS yields control and allows the iLIDS, in active mode, to mate to it.  See 
the iLIDS figure below. 
In support of the NDSP, two iLIDS configurations are used:  the iLIDS-301 and the 
iLIDS-302. 
The iLIDS-301 is a standalone assembly with all required hardware (e.g., 
Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD, electrical boxes, etc.) contained in the 
assembly.  The iLIDS-301 can dock to another iLIDS-301 or to iLIDS-302. 
The iLIDS-302 has most of the same functionality as the iLIDS-301.  The main 
difference is the electrical boxes are integrated in the host vehicle rather than the 
docking system assembly.  Hence, the tunnel structure is shorter (i.e. compact). In 
JSC-63686F 
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addition, the iLIDS-302 relies on the host vehicle for MMOD shielding.  Further, the 
iLIDS-302 does not contain a seal on the mating surface which would support longer 
duration missions such as for the ISS CDA.  Therefore the iLIDS-302 can only dock to 
iLIDS-301.  However, the iLIDS-302 will not be initially certified to perform powered soft 
capture. 
 
 
Figure 3.1-1 - iLIDS-301  
3.1.2 iLIDS Interface Requirements 
From a high-level system perspective, an iLIDS unit will have the following interfaces: 
• iLIDS-to-Host Vehicle. 
• iLIDS (chaser vehicle)-to-iLIDS (mating vehicle). 
• iLIDS-to-Ground Support Equipment (GSE).  The iLIDS System Interface 
Diagram below shows the functions crossing each interface. 
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__________ Solid lines = functional interfaces  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Dashed lines = pass through resources vehicle to vehicle 
Figure 3.1-2 - iLIDS System Interface Diagram  
[R.LIDS.1001] Berthing 
The iLIDS shall support berthing per To Be Specified (TBS)-217. 
Rationale: The iLIDS provides for vehicle-level docking.  The iLIDS design 
shall not preclude berthing.  Refer to Berthing Requirements Document TBS-217 for 
specific berthing requirements. 
3.1.2.1 iLIDS-to-Host Vehicle Interface 
The iLIDS incorporates the following interface functions to the Host Vehicle: 
• iLIDS supports structural/mechanical attachment to the Host Vehicle. 
• iLIDS receives power from the Host Vehicle. 
• iLIDS supports vehicle-to-vehicle transfer of atmosphere, power, data, and 
communications.  Future configurations will include water, fuel, oxidizer, and 
pressurant. 
• iLIDS supports electrical bonding to the Host Vehicle. 
JSC-63686F 
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• iLIDS supplies data to the Host Vehicle. 
• iLIDS receives commands from the Host Vehicle. 
• iLIDS (excluding -302) receives pyrotechnic controller signals from the Host 
Vehicle. 
 
       Note:   * denotes Pyro is not an interface on iLIDS-302 
__________ Solid lines = functional interfaces  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Dashed lines = pass through resources vehicle to vehicle 
Figure 3.1-3 - iLIDS-to-Host Vehicle Interface Diagram  
[R.LIDS.0001] iLIDS Structural Attachment on Host Vehicle 
The iLIDS shall provide structural mating and sealing to the host vehicle per JSC-
65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS-to-Host Vehicle Mounting Interface. 
Rationale: The mating vehicle includes CDA.  The host vehicle will provide 
accommodation to allow iLIDS to attach to the host vehicle.  The iLIDS-to-host 
vehicle is secured/attached by fasteners.  See Figure:  iLIDS-to-Host Vehicle 
Mounting Interface for a schematic of the mounting interface.  The iLIDS will provide 
the fasteners for this interface.  The iLIDS mechanism will be provided as 
Government Furnished Equipment.  Refer to JSC-65795, International Low Impact 
Docking System (iLIDS) Interface Definition Document (IDD) for the details of this 
interface.  The interface defined is based on the common interface used for 
Apollo/Soyuz, Shuttle/Mir, and Shuttle/ISS docking systems. 
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[R.LIDS.0003] Host Electrical Power Interface - 120 Vdc 
The iLIDS (-301, -302) shall operate with host vehicle power of 120 Vdc in accordance 
with JSC-64599, iLIDS Electric Power Quality Description Document. 
Rationale: An electrical power interface is needed to allow the host vehicle to 
power the iLIDS.  This is the power for iLIDS consumption, which is not to be 
confused with the host vehicle pass-through power to the mating vehicle.  Future 
configurations will allow for other host vehicle power (e.g., 28 Vdc). 
[R.LIDS.0004] Reception of Commands for Docking 
The iLIDS shall receive commands from the host vehicle for all sequences as specified 
in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, Appendix C, NDS Commands List. 
Rationale: The host vehicle can send an individual sequence or chain of 
sequences.  JSC-65795 will specify the ordering of sequence; however, it is up to 
the host vehicle's discretion to send the commands. 
[R.LIDS.0006] Docking Termination 
The iLIDS shall terminate docking upon receipt of a command from the host vehicle 
prior to hook activation. 
Rationale: For safety purposes, automated functions such as docking should 
be designed with an override capability that allows the host vehicle to stop, safe, or 
assume manual control of the automated function after it was initiated.  The point at 
which the override occurs will differ depending on the function.  Some activities may 
only be taken to a safe state and no manual control is available.  The intent is to 
cover the time span beginning with SCS mechanism release contact and extending 
through rigidization docking completion.  This ability is required for the Vehicle crew, 
ISS crew, or other Space System operators to control automated functions onboard 
the Vehicle.  It covers the case where the vehicle is unable to achieve capture, 
wants to back out, reset, and make a second docking attempt.  It also covers the 
case where the crew simply becomes uncomfortable with the safety of proceeding 
onward with the docking operation, and wishes to halt it and back away. 
[R.LIDS.0008] Pause Docking Commands 
The iLIDS shall accept a command from the host vehicle to pause the docking 
sequence at predetermined safe points in the sequence. 
Rationale: There are failure scenarios where the docking sequence should not 
be terminated, but rather paused to allow troubleshooting. 
[R.LIDS.0009] Pause Undocking Commands 
The iLIDS shall accept a command from the host vehicle to pause the undocking 
sequence at predetermined safe points in the sequence. 
Rationale: There are failure scenarios where the undocking sequence should 
not be terminated, but rather paused to allow troubleshooting. 
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[R.LIDS.0010] Validation of Commands 
The iLIDS shall validate commands from the host vehicle. 
Rationale: The iLIDS will execute commands generated internally or from 
other systems in order to perform the specified function or operation.  This process 
includes checking if the command has valid data values and if those can be 
executed, based on the current state or mode.  Updates to the corresponding health 
and status parameters provide the results of the command execution. 
[R.LIDS.0011] Command Notification 
The iLIDS shall provide a notification for validity of commands to the host vehicle. 
Rationale: Command notification includes a response for both valid and invalid 
commands.  Command originators need a response or acknowledgement to 
understand the status of a command.  Vehicle command validation failures, 
particularly crew initiated commands, warrant near real-time indication of validation 
failure to the crew, ground, and/or command initiator. 
[R.LIDS.0012] Command Processing Latency 
The iLIDS shall have a command processing latency no greater than 35 ms, where the 
performance measurement is taken from the time the command crosses the host 
vehicle to iLIDS interface to the time the command is acknowledged across the iLIDS to 
host interface, by the iLIDS avionics. 
Rationale: An upper bound on command processing latency must be 
established to drive and manage overall avionics and software system design and 
end-to-end avionics and software performance.  This value is driven by and is the 
part of the time allocation, allocated to iLIDS, from the max total time (200 ms from 
JSC-65795, NDS IDD) required for a switch from system A to B to take place in the 
case of a fault requiring primary control being transferred from system A to B.   This 
value is necessary for the host vehicle to control total execution latency and assures 
that the commands will be received, interpreted and acknowledged in the required 
period.  See also R.LIDS.1116 and R.LIDS.1137. 
[R.LIDS.1116] H&S Data Processing Latency 
The iLIDS shall have a Health and Status (H&S) data processing latency no greater 
than 45 ms, where the performance measurement is taken from the time Health and 
Status (H&S) data is sampled to the time conditioned H&S data crosses the iLIDS to 
host vehicle interface. 
Rationale: An upper bound on H&S data processing latency must be 
established to drive and manage overall avionics and software system design and 
end-to-end avionics and software performance.  This value is driven by and is the 
part of the time allocation, allocated to iLIDS, from the max total time (200 ms from 
NDS IDD) required for a switch from system A to B to take place in the case of a 
fault requiring primary control being transferred from system A to B.  If a fault 
requiring a switch to the redundant string is identified, there is a minimum amount of 
time to detect, report to the vehicle, and the vehicle to issue a command to switch 
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between controllers in order to maintain safe control of the linear actuators, 
depending on the mode and state of iLIDS.  This switch time is most critical during 
dock mode capture and attenuation states.  See also R.LIDS.0012 and 
R.LIDS.1137. 
[R.LIDS.1137] Fault Response Performance 
The iLIDS shall be capable of detecting any internal fault, notifying the host vehicle of 
the fault via the H&S data, and executing a fault response command from the host 
vehicle within 200 ms, including 120 ms of communication and processing time within 
the host vehicle. 
Rationale: The iLIDS must be capable of detecting and responding to faults 
quickly during docking attempts to ensure adequate dynamic performance in the 
event that system B is needed to complete a docking attempt or in the event a 
docking attempt abort is needed.  iLIDS dynamics simulations will use this 200 ms 
time as the idle time between system A and system B operations and between 
system B operations and the beginning of a docking attempt abort.  The requirement 
is based on the two associative requirements (R.LIDS.0012 and R.LIDS.1116). The 
iLIDS will send signals in 35 ms and receive in 45 ms. 
[R.LIDS.0014] iLIDS Health and Status During iLIDS Operations 
The iLIDS shall generate and provide health and status information to the host vehicle 
during iLIDS operations as specified in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, Appendix D - NDS MSID. 
Rationale: This includes generic health and status data as well as data from 
safety and mission critical functions.  This requirement meets the intent of SSP 
50021, Safety Requirements Document, Section 3.3.6.1.5.2 and SSP 41000, 
System Specification for the International Space Station, section 3.3.6.4. 
[R.LIDS.0017] Communications with the Host Vehicle (EIA-422-B) 
The iLIDS shall communicate with the host vehicle per the electrical characteristics 
specified in ANSI/TIA/EIA-422-B. 
Rationale: This standard provides reliable serial communications.  The iLIDS 
has requirements to be able to communicate in either EIA-422-B or MIL-STD-1553B 
but not both to a single host vehicle.  The host vehicle supplied interfacing connector 
to iLIDS can only be wired for one of the two communication protocol types. 
[R.LIDS.0019] Execution of Commands 
The iLIDS shall execute valid commands received from the host vehicle. 
Rationale: The iLIDS will execute commands generated from the host vehicle 
in order to perform the specified function or operation. 
[R.LIDS.0020] Status of Execution of Commands 
The iLIDS shall provide execution status of commands to the host vehicle. 
Rationale: Command initiators should know the status of host vehicle 
commands to the iLIDS for monitoring and awareness of the iLIDS state. 
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[R.LIDS.0024] Transfer of Data and Communications 
The iLIDS to Vehicle umbilical interfaces shall be capable of transferring hard-line MIL-
STD-1553 and 10/100 Base T Ethernet data and communications between the mated 
vehicles. 
Rationale: Hard line communication allows command and data handling 
between the mated vehicles.  The formats provided are based on current ISS 
capability. 
[R.LIDS.0024.1] Ethernet Cable Specification 
The iLIDS umbilical cabling for 100 BASE-TX network segments shall be constructed 
using shielded twisted pair Category 5e components in accordance with ANSI/TIA/EIA 
568B.2, Annex N, Commercial Building Telecommunications Cabling Standard, Part 2: 
Balanced Twisted-Pair Cabling Components of maximum physical cable length not to 
exceed 4 feet. 
Rationale: Ethernet cable for flight hardware is to be constructed using 
approved standards. 
[R.LIDS.0024.2] MIL-STD-1553 Cable Specification 
The iLIDS umbilical cabling for MIL-STD-1553 communication shall be constructed in 
accordance with SSQ 21655, Cable, Electrical, MIL-STD-1553 Databus, Space Quality, 
General Specification, with a maximum physical cable length not to exceed 4 feet. 
Rationale: MIL-STD-1553 cable for flight hardware is to be constructed using 
approved standards. 
[R.LIDS.0026] Bonding 
The iLIDS to host vehicle interface shall meet Class R bonding requirements in 
accordance with NASA-STD-4003, Electrical Bonding for NASA Launch Vehicles, 
Spacecraft, Payloads, and Flight Equipment. 
Rationale: The mating vehicle includes the CDA.  Adherence to approved 
standards. 
[R.LIDS.0091] Automatic Safing with Manual Override for Temperature 
Control 
iLIDS heaters shall allow for individual zones to be commanded on and off by the host 
vehicle in order for the host vehicle to provide manual override for temperature control. 
Rationale: This requirement supports the host vehicle capability to comply with 
JPR 8080.5 standard G-16 
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[R.LIDS.0041] Leak Rates for iLIDS Feed-Throughs When Mated (Excluding -
302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) feed-throughs internal to iLIDS shall have a maximum of 
0.0007 lbm dry air/day (0.0003 kg air/day) leakage at vestibule pressurization of 14.7 
psia (101 kPa) and an external vacuum pressure when mated. 
Rationale: The leakage value is based on 14 Class 77H hermetic feed-
throughs (4X size 25 connectors, 10X size 13 connectors).  See also R.LIDS.1113 
and R.LIDS.1114. 
[R.LIDS.1113] Leak Rate for iLIDS-to-iLIDS Interface 
The iLIDS-to-iLIDS interface shall have a maximum of 0.0025 lbm dry air/day (0.0011 
kg air/day) leakage at vestibule pressurization of 14.7 psia (101 kPa) and an external 
vacuum pressure when mated. 
Rationale: The leakage value assumes 12 HCS hooks fully engaged and 
derives from a nominal ISS trajectory and exposure to 1E21 atoms/cm2 atomic 
oxygen and 214 equivalent sun hours (To Be Resolved (TBR)-212) ultraviolet 
radiation (for a duration of up to 21 days).  The atomic oxygen exposure includes 
both pre-treatment of the seals and on-orbit exposure at 4.4 x 10E19 oxygen 
atoms/cm2 per day.  See also R.LIDS.0041 and R.LIDS.1114. 
[R.LIDS.1114] Leak Rate for iLIDS-to-Vehicle Interface 
The iLIDS-to-vehicle interface shall have a maximum of 0.0008 lbm dry air/day (0.0004 
kg air/day) leakage at vestibule pressurization of 14.7 psia (101 kPa) and an external 
vacuum pressure when mated. 
Rationale: The leakage value is based on room temperature static leakage 
testing with allowances for expected thermal excursions.  See also R.LIDS.0041 and 
R.LIDS.1113. 
[R.LIDS.1129] Communications with the Host Vehicle (MIL-STD-1553B) 
The iLIDS shall communicate with the host vehicle per the electrical characteristics 
specified in MIL-STD-1553B. 
Rationale: This standard provides reliable serial communications.  The iLIDS 
has requirements to be able to communicate in either EIA-422-B or MIL-STD-1553B 
but not both to a single host vehicle.  The host vehicle supplied interfacing connector 
to iLIDS can only be wired for one of the two communication protocol types. 
[R.LIDS.1130] Message Formats with the Host Vehicle (MIL-STD-1553B) 
The iLIDS shall use message formats specified in JSC-65795, NDS IDD for the MIL-
STD-1553 communication interface. 
Rationale: This document provides the data format and timing required to 
communicate over t he MIL-STD-1553 data bus. 
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[R.LIDS.1131] Distinguishing Communications with the Host Vehicle (EIA-
422-B vs. MIL-STD-1553B) 
The iLIDS shall determine the host vehicle communication protocol (EIA-422-B or MIL-
STD-1553B) by checking for shorted pins on the host vehicle connector. 
Rationale: The iLIDS has requirements to be able to communicate in either 
EIA-422-B or MIL-STD-1553B but not both to a single host vehicle.  The host vehicle 
supplied interfacing connector to iLIDS can only be wired for one of the two 
communication protocol types.  The iLIDS must determine the host vehicle 
communication type in order to communicate with the vehicle. 
[R.LIDS.1132] Duplex Communications with the Host Vehicle (EIA-422-B) 
The iLIDS shall communicate with the host vehicle in full duplex, using differential 
signaling with two unidirectional, nonreversible point to point terminated transmission 
lines. 
Rationale: This is the iLIDS specific implementation of EIA-422-B. 
[R.LIDS.1133] Data Exchange with the Host Vehicle (EIA-422-B) 
The iLIDS shall exchange data with the host vehicle in an asynchronous serial 
communications format utilizing a Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter 
(UART) controller, Non-Return to Zero (NRZ) with one start bit, 8 data bits (Least 
Significant Bit (LSB) first) and one stop bit. 
Rationale: This is the iLIDS specific implementation of EIA-422-B. 
[R.LIDS.1134] Message Exchange with the Host Vehicle (EIA-422-B) 
The iLIDS shall exchange messages with the host vehicle of a fixed packet length, with 
a bit rate of 921.6 kilobaud, and a status update rate of 50 Hz. 
Rationale: This is the iLIDS specific implementation of EIA-422-B. 
[R.LIDS.5022] FRAM-Type Connector Pinouts 
The iLIDS Flight Releasable Attachment Mechanism (FRAM)-Type Connectors shall 
utilize the pinouts as defined in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, table FRAM-Type Connector 
Pinouts. 
Rationale: Each connector is a SSQ22680 FRAM-type connector that contains 
both power and data in the same connector shell.  Separate power and data cable 
bundles are routed to the connector then combined in the connector backshell.  
Maximum possible separation is maintained inside the connector. 
[R.LIDS.5034] Heater Power and Control 
The iLIDS shall provide redundant heater control for two channels. 
Rationale: Only one channel is actively controlling a heater zone at a time 
while the other channel is powered and processing data (e.g., checking Resistance 
Temperature Detectors (RTDs), sending H&S, etc.) ready to actively control the 
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heater zone if the other channel fails.  Refer to JSC-64599, Electric Power Quality 
Description Document for heater power timelines. 
3.1.2.2 iLIDS-to-iLIDS Interface 
The iLIDS integrated on the Vehicle incorporates the following interfaces when mated to 
another iLIDS: 
• Support structural/mechanical attachment. 
• Supports vehicle-to-vehicle transfer of atmosphere, power, data, and 
communications.  Future configurations will include water, fuel, oxidizer, and 
pressurant. 
• Support soft-capture through electromagnets.  The iLIDS-to-iLIDS system 
interface is illustrated in the iLIDS System Interface Diagram. 
[R.LIDS.1142] IDSS IDD Compatibility 
The iLIDS shall be compatible with the IDSS IDD Rev A. 
Rationale: The IDSS IDD establishes standards for compatibility across all 
docking system designs such that they are capable of interfacing and safely docking 
with one another.  The iLIDS design is based on docking interface features and 
loads specified in the NDS IDD that are also compatible with those specified in the 
IDSS IDD. 
[R.LIDS.0029] Structural/Mechanical Attachment 
The iLIDS shall provide an interface with 24 attachment points per JSC-65795, NDS 
IDD, figure HCS Hook Configurations and figure HCS Docking Interface where 12 active 
hooks on one system are nominally closed to engage 12 passive hooks on the mating 
system. 
Rationale: The mating vehicle includes the CDA.  The 24 points allows for 
nominal 12 hook pressurized/mated load carrying capability or enhanced 24 hook 
load capability.  Alternatively, the passive hooks allow for a mated vehicle with active 
hooks to provide redundancy for hard mate in the event of a failure to hook. 
[R.LIDS.0030] Transfer of Power 
The iLIDS umbilical interfaces shall provide five 8 American Wire Gauge (AWG) 
conductors for electrical power transfer per umbilical with a maximum physical cable 
length of 4 feet. 
Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to allow for power transference 
between two mated systems.  This is not the power for the iLIDS consumption.  The 
five lines give the host options to transfer redundant feeds of two different voltages.  
ISS will be capable of transferring both 120 Vdc and 28 Vdc.  However, ISS is not 
expected to transfer both at the same time. 
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[R.LIDS.0034] Automatic Umbilical Demating 
The iLIDS-to-iLIDS umbilical interface shall automatically demate during undocking 
operations. 
Rationale: The mating vehicle includes the CDA.  The umbilicals for power, 
data, etc. are intended to demate without crew intervention during the undocking 
sequence.  This facilitates emergency undocking scenarios. 
[R.LIDS.0037] Soft Capture 
The iLIDS SCS-to-iLIDS SCS shall meet Class S bonding requirements in accordance 
with NASA-STD-4003, Electrical Bonding for NASA Launch Vehicles, Spacecraft, 
Payloads, and Flight Equipment. 
Rationale: The SCS adheres to approved standards to provide a controlled 
resistance path to mitigate hazards caused by potential differences in electrical 
potential between mating vehicles during contact. 
[R.LIDS.0038] Hard Capture 
The iLIDS HCS-to-iLIDS HCS shall meet Class R bonding requirements in accordance 
with NASA-STD-4003, Electrical Bonding for NASA Launch Vehicles, Spacecraft, 
Payloads, and Flight Equipment. 
Rationale: (1) to prevent possible circulating currents in interconnected 
electrical power systems; (2) to mitigate ground-conducted noise that could 
significantly degrade signal noise margins of intravehicular communications 
systems; and (3) to ensure a common voltage reference for intervehicular avionics 
systems connections.  This does not apply to umbilicals. 
[R.LIDS.1004] Hook Compliance 
The iLIDS shall implement compliance on the passive hook of the mating active-passive 
hook pair. 
Rationale: To successfully structurally mate with another docking system, it is 
necessary to specify where the compliance is located in the active/passive hook 
pairing. 
[R.LIDS.1005] HCS Guide Pins 
The iLIDS shall provide guide pins for tangential constraint and alignment of the 
systems during hard mate per JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure HCS Guide Pin Detail and 
figure HCS Docking Interface. 
Rationale: Guide pin/receptacles provide fine alignment during soft capture 
system retraction and restrict rotation and shear of the systems while mated.  See 
also R.LIDS.0029 for the figure depicting guide pin location. 
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[R.LIDS.1005.1] HCS Guide Pin Receptacles 
The iLIDS shall provide guide pin receptacles for tangential constraint and alignment of 
the systems during hard mate per JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure HCS Guide Pin Hole 
Detail and figure HCS Docking Interface. 
Rationale: Guide pin/receptacles provide fine alignment during SCS retraction 
and restrict rotation and shear of the systems while mated.  See also R.LIDS.0029 
for the figure depicting guide pin receptacle location. 
[R.LIDS.1006] Seal on Seal Mating Interface (Excluding -302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) HCS seal on seal mating plane shall meet the details as 
specified in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS (excluding -302) HCS Mating Plane Seal 
and Electrical Bonding Details. 
Rationale: The docking system must include a seal interface to support 
pressurization after structural mate.  The seals meet the emerging IDSS and support 
either seal on seal or seal on metal operation.  The corresponding figure in JSC-
65795, NDS IDD, provides interface definition for the HCS Mating Plane. 
[R.LIDS.1007] Seal on Metal Mating Interface (-302) 
The iLIDS (-302) HCS seal on metal mating plane shall meet the details as specified in 
JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS (-302) HCS Mating Plane Seal and Electrical 
Bonding Details. 
Rationale: Although the iLIDS is designed for seal on seal mated operations, 
the iLIDS for ISS will have a metallic sealing surface which will be more durable for 
the longer life of the ISS hardware.  The corresponding figure in JSC-65795, NDS 
IDD, provides interface definition for the HCS Mating Plane. 
[R.LIDS.1037] Umbilical Connector Mate Indication 
The iLIDS shall provide loop back circuits for the host to verify connector mating on 
power and data umbilical connectors. 
Rationale: This allows confirmation prior to power and data transfer that 
mating is successful. 
[R.LIDS.1094] iLIDS Automatic/Manual Sequencing 
The iLIDS shall provide the capability to operate sequences either automatically or 
manually via software control. 
Rationale: Such operation allows the user to initiate sequences automatically 
or to manually step through the sequences.  The iLIDS default is automatic 
sequencing. 
[R.LIDS.1095] iLIDS Active Dock Mode 
The iLIDS shall provide an Active Dock mode of operations. 
Rationale: The Active Docking mode includes the entire docking sequence 
and all related flags as well as health and status data. 
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[R.LIDS.1096] iLIDS Active Undock Mode 
The iLIDS shall provide an Active Undock mode of operations. 
Rationale: The Active Undocking mode includes the entire undocking 
sequence and all related flags as well as health and status data. 
[R.LIDS.1097] iLIDS Passive Dock Mode 
The iLIDS shall provide a Passive Dock mode of operations. 
Rationale: During the Passive Dock mode, the iLIDS will provide all H&S data 
as well as flags for soft capture.  In addition, all outputs will be inhibited during 
operation (e.g., motors, magnets, etc.). 
[R.LIDS.1098] iLIDS Passive Undock Mode 
The iLIDS shall provide a Passive Undock mode of operations which inhibits all outputs, 
while providing H&S data and flags. 
Rationale: During the Passive Undock mode, the iLIDS will provide all H&S 
data as well as flags for undocking completion.  In addition, all outputs will be 
inhibited during operation (e.g., motors, magnets, etc.). 
[R.LIDS.1099] iLIDS Safe Mode 
The iLIDS shall provide a Safe mode of operations which inhibits all outputs, while 
providing H&S data. 
Rationale: During the Safe mode, the iLIDS will provide all H&S data.  In 
addition, all outputs will be inhibited during operation (e.g., motors, magnets, etc.). 
[R.LIDS.1100] iLIDS Check-out Mode 
The iLIDS shall provide a Check-out mode of operations to exercise the iLIDS 
mechanism through a pre-determined sequence. 
Rationale: The Check-out mode detects damage and errors in iLIDS by 
exercising the iLIDS mechanisms through a pre-determined sequence. 
[R.LIDS.1101] iLIDS Engineering Mode 
The iLIDS shall provide an Engineering mode of operations to support troubleshooting 
without the constraints of other modes. 
Rationale: The Engineering mode supports troubleshooting without the 
constraints of all other modes.  For example, the Engineering mode will allow the 
user to command a single motor on/off.  It is critical to adhere to proper procedures 
during this mode. 
JSC-63686F 
19 
[R.LIDS.1112] Umbilical Auto-Mate 
The iLIDS shall automatically mate umbilical connectors within 15 minutes of achieving 
hard mate. 
Rationale: Umbilical connector mate is critical function for resource transfer. It 
is necessary to perform this action without Extravehicular Activity/Intravehicular 
Activity (EVA/IVA). 
[R.LIDS.1124] iLIDS Active Hook Profile 
The iLIDS shall provide active hooks as defined in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure HCS 
Active Hook Detail. 
Rationale: The iLIDS, when mated, has 24 attachment points where 12 active 
hooks on one system engage 12 passive hooks on the mating system to carry 
nominal loads.  The hook profile allows mating with the emerging IDSS.  Refer to 
corresponding requirement ID in JSC-65795, NDS IDD. 
[R.LIDS.1125] iLIDS Passive Hook Profile 
The iLIDS shall provide passive hooks as defined in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure HCS 
Passive Hook Detail (excluding -304). 
Rationale: The iLIDS, when mated, has 24 attachment points where 12 active 
hooks on one system engage 12 passive hooks on the mating system to carry 
nominal loads.  The hook profile allows mating with the emerging IDSS.  Refer to 
corresponding requirement ID in JSC-65795, NDS IDD. 
3.1.2.4 iLIDS-to-EVA Interface 
The iLIDS-to-EVA interface only includes translation around the exterior of the iLIDS 
while docked.  If EVA occurs while undocked, the docking surfaces (i.e. "face") of the 
iLIDS tunnel is an EVA Keep-out Zone (KOZ) in addition to the interior of the tunnel.  
Refer to JSC-65795, NDS IDD for EVA KOZ. 
[R.LIDS.0046] EVA Sharp Edges 
Any iLIDS hardware accessible to the EVA crew within 24" of an adjacent EVA worksite, 
excluding the defined iLIDS EVA Keep-out-zone, shall meet the edge, corner, and 
protrusion requirements in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 of JSC-28918, EVA Design 
Requirements and Considerations. 
Rationale: These edge, corner, and protrusion requirements were originally 
developed to prevent the cutting of the EMU glove.  This requirement is in 
accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design Requirements and Considerations, 
Section 3.11. 
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[R.LIDS.0047] EVA Thin Materials 
The iLIDS materials less than 0.08-in. (2.032-mm) thick that are used in a location 
accessible to EVA, edge radii shall be greater than 0.003-in. (0.0762-mm), and exposed 
edges shall be uniformly spaced, not to exceed 0.5-in. (1.27-cm) gaps, flush at the 
exposed surface plane and shielded from direct EVA interaction. 
Rationale: These edge and corner requirements were originally developed to 
prevent the cutting of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) glove.  This 
requirement is in accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design Requirements and 
Considerations, Section 3.11.2 and modified to represent the correct conversion 
factor. 
[R.LIDS.0050] Burrs 
iLIDS exposed surfaces accessible to EVA crew shall be smooth and free of burrs. 
Rationale: Burrs are potential sharp edges and, therefore, can possibly cause 
an EVA suit catastrophic leakage.  This is in accordance with JSC-28918, EVA 
Design Requirements and Considerations, Section 3.15. 
[R.LIDS.0051] Screws and Bolts 
iLIDS hardware accessible to the EVA crew shall include protective features on screws 
or bolts in established worksites (planned and contingency) and translation routes to 
prevent snagging, and to protect against sharp edges and impact. 
Rationale: Snagging of the EVA suit or umbilicals could cause a tear, resulting 
in suit catastrophic leakages.  Additionally, sharp-edge cuts and impact punctures 
could cause suit catastrophic leakages.  This requirement is in accordance with 
JSC-28918, EVA Design Requirements and Considerations, Section 3.13. 
[R.LIDS.0052] Hardware Protrusion 
The iLIDS hardware shall be free of hardware protruding into the translation corridor as 
shown in Figure 4-6 of JSC-28918, EVA Design Requirements and Considerations, 
except for translation aids. 
Rationale: Protrusions into the translation path are potential snag points (suit 
and umbilical tear hazard) and EVA suit impact hazards (puncture hazard).  The 
109-cm (43-in.) diameter translation path is based upon the EMU, which is a Space 
Transportation System (STS)/ISS legacy and derives from JSC-28918, EVA Design 
Requirements and Considerations, Paragraph 4.20.1.1.  This requirement is in 
accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design Requirements and Considerations, 
Section 3.17. 
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[R.LIDS.0054] Entrapment Hazard - Snagging 
Any iLIDS hardware that is EVA-accessible shall preclude snagging an EVA 
crewmember, umbilical, or a limb/tether, such that an EVA crewmember cannot be 
freed from entrapment. 
Rationale: Inability to free an entrapped EVA crewmember is a catastrophic 
hazard. This requirement is in accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design 
Requirements and Considerations, Section 3.19.1. 
[R.LIDS.0055] Pinch Points 
The iLIDS shall ensure that hardware located within translation paths and established 
worksites (planned and contingency) that is EVA-accessible does not have pinch 
hazards. 
Rationale: This applies to, but is not limited to, hardware that pivots, retracts, 
flexes, or has a configuration such that a gap of greater than 0.5 in. (12.7 mm), but 
less than 1.4 in. (3.556 cm) (glove pinching), exists between the equipment and 
adjacent structure.  Any item that has a potential to pinch any appendage, including 
legs or other body parts, will also be designed out or protected against, either by 
using a KOZ for areas outside a translation path or worksite or by using a physical 
barrier.  This requirement is in accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design 
Requirements and Considerations, Section 3.18. 
[R.LIDS.0056] Entrapment Hazard - Trapping 
iLIDS hardware that is EVA-accessible shall preclude trapping an EVA crewmember, 
umbilical, or a limb/tether, such that the EVA crew could not be freed. 
Rationale: Inability to free an entrapped EVA crewmember is a catastrophic 
hazard. This requirement is in accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design 
Requirements and Considerations, Section 3.19.1. 
[R.LIDS.0057] Exposed Circular Holes 
Exposed circular holes on iLIDS accessible to EVA crew shall be less than 0.5 in. (1.27 
cm) in diameter or greater than 1.4 in. (3.556 cm) in diameter to prevent entrapment of 
an EVA suit-gloved finger. 
Rationale: Entrapment of the EVA crewmember or damage to the EVA suit, 
and possible suit leakage, while freeing the entrapped appendage is considered a 
catastrophic hazard.  Holes that are irregularly shaped will be evaluated individually 
as a part of the safety process.  This requirement is in accordance with JSC-28918, 
EVA Design Requirements and Considerations, Section 3.16. 
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[R.LIDS.0058] EVA Induced Loads 
iLIDS hardware within the EVA translation corridor, as shown in Figure 4-6 of JSC-
28918, or adjacent EVA worksite, as defined in Figure 4-15 of JSC-28918, shall meet 
the requirements for Inadvertent Kick Loads, as defined in JSC-28918, EVA Design 
Requirements and Considerations, Table 4.7, EVA-Induced Loads. 
Rationale: EVA can induce significant loads into surrounding hardware and 
structure.  These loads were compiled over several years of EVA with legacy EMU 
hardware.  Meeting this requirement means that the hardware, when exposed to 
EVA crew-induced loads, shall not: a) create a hazardous condition; b) suffer loss of 
structural integrity; or c) suffer a loss of functionality.  This requirement is in 
accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design Requirements and Considerations, 
Section 4.9. 
[R.LIDS.0060] Glove Palm External Touch-Temperature Compliance 
The iLIDS hardware that interfaces with the EVA glove palm shall be in accordance with 
JSC-28918, EVA Design Requirements and Considerations, Section 4.4.4. 
Rationale: The iLIDS will provide input into the integrated thermal analysis.  
These limits do not apply to the backside of the glove and the EMU Thermal 
Micrometeoroid Garment (TMG) orthofabric that have different standards set out in 
Section 4.4.5, see R.LIDS.1121. 
[R.LIDS.1121] EMU TMG Orthofabric and Glove Back External Touch-
Temperature Compliance 
The iLIDS hardware that interfaces with the EMU TMG orthofabric, which includes the 
backside of the EMU glove, shall be in accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design 
Requirements and Considerations, Section 4.4.5. 
Rationale: The iLIDS will provide input into the integrated thermal analysis.  
These limits do not apply to the palm of the glove that has different standards set out 
in Section 4.4.4.  See R.LIDS.0060. 
[R.LIDS.0061] DC Magnetic Field 
The iLIDS shall preclude emitting Direct Current (DC) magnetic fields in excess of 250 
Gauss during EVA translation across the iLIDS. 
Rationale: This requirement will preclude interference with the EVA suit 
electronics/electrical systems and EVA tool electrical assemblies.  This requirement 
is in accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design Requirements and Considerations, 
Section 3.5.3. 
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[R.LIDS.1119] iLIDS Hazardous Energy Provision 
iLIDS shall design or use components that retain hazardous energy, either with design 
features that prevent releasing the stored energy in any manner that could pose a 
hazard to the EVA crewmember or with provisions to allow safing of the potential 
energy, including provisions to confirm that the safing was successful. 
Rationale: This requirement is in accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design 
Requirements and Considerations, Section 3.7. 
3.2 Characteristics 
3.2.1 Functional Performance 
3.2.1.1 Docking 
[R.LIDS.0063] Docking Envelope (Excluding -302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall be capable of docking when the vehicle misalignments 
and relative motions are within the parameters as specified by JSC-65795, NDS IDD, 
table NDS Initial Contact Conditions "Design To" Limits. 
Rationale: Table NDS Initial Contact Conditions "Design To" Limits includes 
high-level information on capture envelope data. 
[R.LIDS.0064] Initial Contact Signal 
The iLIDS, when in Active mode, shall provide a signal indication of initial contact. 
Rationale: This indication is required by the host vehicle to perform attitude 
and translational system moding during capture operations. 
[R.LIDS.0065] Soft Capture (Excluding -302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall perform soft capture during docking operations. 
Rationale: Soft capture is the initial physical connection prior to final structural 
mating. 
[R.LIDS.0066] Soft-Capture Signal Indication 
The iLIDS shall provide a signal indication of soft capture during docking operations. 
Rationale: This indication allows the host vehicle to initiate proper moding. 
[R.LIDS.0069] Attenuation (Excluding -302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall attenuate relative motion between the two mating 
vehicles, subject to the mass properties, load constraints, and contact conditions 
specified in JSC-65970, iLIDS Thermal and Induced Environments (iLIDS TIES), during 
docking operations. 
Rationale: JSC-65970, iLIDS Thermal and Induced Environments (iLIDS 
TIES), includes load attenuations and mass properties, among other properties. 
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[R.LIDS.0071] Hard-Capture Signal Indication 
The iLIDS shall provide a signal indication of hard capture during docking operations. 
Rationale: Hard capture signal indication indicates structural mating. 
[R.LIDS.0073] Docking Time During Free Drift 
The iLIDS shall require no more than 20 minutes of free drift once docking has been 
initiated. 
Rationale: When the host vehicle is in free drift, the time needs to be limited to 
20 minutes to preclude vehicle problems, such as solar arrays pointing away from 
the sun.  Free drift starts upon initial contact of the load cell and ends with latches 
engaging. 
[R.LIDS.5007] iLIDS Mating Interface Allowable Thermal Differential 
The iLIDS shall achieve hard capture within the boundaries of the acceptable 
temperature regions as defined in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS Mating Interface 
Allowable Thermal Differential for Hard Capture. 
Rationale: Hard capture includes engaging hooks and seal interface.  The 
allowable temperature differential between the sealing interfaces during docking 
hard capture is restricted.  If the temperatures are not within the defined boundaries, 
a thermal hold prior to hard latching is required until the temperature requirements 
are satisfied. 
[R.LIDS.5008] iLIDS Capture Ring in Passive Mode 
The iLIDS, when in Passive mode, shall have the soft capture ring configured in 
accordance with JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS Capture Ring in Passive Mode. 
Rationale: The iLIDS performs soft capture using electromagnets and 
magnetic striker plates.  The Passive mode iLIDS will also be scarred for future 
implementation of an SCS mechanical latch striker interface, which would allow an 
iLIDS-compatible docking system, using passive SCS mechanical latch striker, to 
capture.  Soft capture is not structural mating, but the first level of attachment in the 
docking sequence. 
[R.LIDS.5009] iLIDS Capture Ring in Active Mode 
The iLIDS, when in Active mode, shall have the soft capture ring configured in 
accordance with JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS Capture Ring in Active Mode. 
Rationale: The iLIDS performs soft capture using electromagnets and 
magnetic striker plates.  The Passive mode iLIDS will also be scarred for future 
implementation of an SCS mechanical latch striker interface, which would allow an 
iLIDS-compatible docking system, using passive SCS mechanical latch striker, to 
capture.  Soft capture is not structural mating, but the first level of attachment in the 
docking sequence. 
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[R.LIDS.5010] SCS Guide Petal System 
The iLIDS guide petals shall be configured as detailed in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure 
SCS Guide Petal System. 
Rationale: There are three guide petals that mount to the soft capture ring and 
face inward.  The petals are equally spaced around the circumference of the soft 
capture docking ring. 
[R.LIDS.5011] SCS Guide Petal System Detail 
The iLIDS guide petals shall meet the features as detailed in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, 
figure SCS Guide Petal System Detail. 
Rationale: There are three guide petals that mount to the soft capture ring and 
face inward.  The petals are equally spaced around the circumference of the soft 
capture docking ring. 
[R.LIDS.5012] SCS Ring Dimensions 
The iLIDS SCS dimensions shall be in accordance with JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure 
SCS Guide Petal System Profile. 
Rationale: The iLIDS is NASA's implementation for the emerging IDSS using 
low impact docking technology.  The figure also identifies mechanical latch striker 
mounting holes, which provide scarring for future implementation of a mechanical 
latch striker interface. 
[R.LIDS.5013] SCS Magnet and Striker 
The SCS shall employ three magnets and three striker plates distributed across the soft 
capture ring, as defined in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure SCS Magnetic Capture System. 
Rationale: The iLIDS performs soft capture using electromagnets and 
magnetic striker plates. 
[R.LIDS.5014] Pre-Capture SCS Compressive Force Resistance 
The iLIDS soft capture interface shall have no more than 6 lb compressive force 
resistance during capture. 
Rationale: The low impact technology SCS requires minimal compressive 
force resistance across the interface prior to capture.  To maximize the benefit of low 
impact technology, a maximum of 12 lb compressive force resistance is allowed 
across the interface.  This means each side is allowed to have a maximum of 6 lb 
resistance.  This resistance might include magnet strikers compliance mechanisms, 
the SCS capture sensors, and any other sources of compressive force resistance. 
[R.LIDS.5061] Maximum Temperature Differential for SCS Mating Interfaces 
The iLIDS-SCS to iLIDS-SCS shall have a maximum allowable temperature differential 
of 100 °F (56 °C) for soft capture. 
Rationale: This restriction is based on thermal expansion limits for the 
engagement of the mating guide petals in the mating iLIDS. 
JSC-63686F 
26 
3.2.1.2 Undocking 
[R.LIDS.0075] Undocking Time 
The iLIDS shall be capable of undocking within 10 minutes when iLIDS undocking 
sequence is initiated. 
Rationale: The requirement implies that all nominal systems are required to be 
operational within this time, including GN&C parameters.  The undocking sequence 
begins with the hatch secured and the crew's initiation of the iLIDS undocking 
sequence. 
[R.LIDS.0076] Indication of Physical Separation 
The iLIDS shall provide a signal indication of physical separation during undocking 
operations. 
Rationale: This indication is required by the host vehicle to perform attitude 
and translational system moding during undocking operations. 
[R.LIDS.0079] Adjustability of iLIDS Performance Parameters 
The iLIDS shall accept software reconfiguration, via commands, of soft capture system 
controller performance parameters to accommodate capture/attenuation of various 
mass vehicles within the load set defined in JSC-65970, iLIDS Thermal and Induced 
Environments (iLIDS TIES). 
Rationale: This requirement will allow iLIDS reconfiguration (through software 
parameters or mode settings).  For example, iLIDS can be reconfigured to make the 
Six Degrees of Freedom (6-DOF) platform load reaction stiffer for a particular 
mission or docking scenario. 
[R.LIDS.1042] Pyrotechnic Initiation (Excluding -302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall use NASA Standard Initiators (NSIs) for pyrotechnic 
devices. 
Rationale: Pyrotechnic provides additional fault tolerance for undocking 
hazards.  iLIDS pyrotechnics are safety-critical because their inadvertent operation 
results in a catastrophic hazard.  Use of proven NSI design ensures safe and 
reliable pyrotechnic design and operation.  This requirement is in accordance with 
SSP 50021, Safety Requirements Document, Section 3.3.6.5.1.1.  The -302 is 
intended for use on ISS and has been decided to not include pyros so that the port 
cannot be fouled by firing pyros and disabling hooks for future docking. 
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[R.LIDS.1069] Separation System - Demate 
The iLIDS shall provide a separation system capable of providing demate work (energy) 
between 28.9 ft-lb (4.0 kgf-m) and 31.1 ft-lb (4.3 kgf-m) after umbilical and seal 
demating. 
Rationale: Docking systems historically have provided a means to accelerate 
the vehicle away when the structural mate mechanism is released.  The system 
must be capable of demating connectors and overcoming seal stiction in addition to 
providing the demating energy.  Refer to corresponding requirement ID in JSC-
65795, NDS IDD. 
[R.LIDS.1115] Pyrotechnic Release (Excluding -302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall provide pyrotechnics in both the active and passive 
hooks at the hard mate interface capable of releasing a single gang of 6 hooks within 
150 ms, allowing the host vehicle to separate from the mated vehicle. 
Rationale: If the iLIDS active hooks fail to unlatch, the host vehicle may fire the 
pyrotechnic(s) to release the gang(s) of hooks containing the failed hooks allowing 
the host to separate from the mated vehicle.  The iLIDS active and passive hooks 
are distributed across 4 gangs of 6 hooks each (2 active hook gangs and 2 passive 
hook gangs) for a total of 24 hooks (12 active and 12 passive). 
[R.LIDS.5021] Umbilical Separation - Passive 
The iLIDS umbilicals shall be designed to be separated passively by the energized 
separation system in the event of a failure to retract. 
Rationale: The iLIDS umbilical connector interfaces transfer resources 
between the docked vehicles.  On undocking, these connectors are nominally driven 
to the unmated state prior to unlatching the hooks.  This requirement ensures the 
umbilical mechanism design accounts for the off-nominal case of passive umbilical 
separation.  Passive separation requires only axial loads to disengage the umbilical 
connector. 
3.2.2 Physical 
[R.LIDS.0082] iLIDS Pass-Through Diameter, Petals Removed 
With SCS guide petals removed, the iLIDS shall provide an unobstructed minimum 
diameter passage for pressurized transfer of crew and cargo with no permanent 
protrusions, drag-through cables, or obstruction, excluding the inter-module ventilation 
air duct as specified in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS Docking Interface. 
Rationale: Pressurized transfer of cargo and unsuited crew, etc. is the primary 
purpose of docking the Vehicle.  SSP 50005, Section 8.8.3.1 requires a minimum 
pass-through diameter of 32 in. be available for translation paths. 
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[R.LIDS.0082.1] iLIDS Pass-Through Diameter, With Petals 
With SCS guide petals installed, the iLIDS shall provide the unobstructed minimum 
diameter passage for pressurized transfer of crew and cargo with no permanent 
protrusions, drag-through cables, or obstruction, excluding the inter-module ventilation 
air duct as specified in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS Docking Interface. 
Rationale: With the petals installed it is still a requirement to provide a clear 
passage for unsuited crew, cargo, etc.  Value is based on study by ISS for cargo 
transfer. 
3.2.2.1 Mass 
[R.LIDS.0080] iLIDS (-301) Mass 
The iLIDS (-301) mass shall not exceed 750 lbm (340.91 kg). 
Rationale: This is the mass with Mass Growth Allowance (MGA). 
[R.LIDS.1056] iLIDS (-302) Mass 
The iLIDS (-302) mass shall not exceed 704 lbm (320.0 kg). 
Rationale: This allocation is based on the -301 with adjustments per the -302 
configuration differences.  The -302 mass does not include host-supplied 
components (e.g., MMOD shield, Thermal Protection System [TPS], etc.).  The mass 
of these host-provided integration components is dependent on the host 
implementation.  The -302 mass does include cabling and electrical box mass for the 
NDS-provided, host-mounted boxes. 
3.2.2.2 Dimensions/Volume 
Dimensions and volume are defined in JSC-65795, NDS IDD.  iLIDS will meet all IDD 
definitions as defined by [R.LIDS.1085]. 
[R.LIDS.5003] iLIDS Volume and Keep Out Zones 
The iLIDS envelope shall be in accordance with JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS 
Cross Section. 
Rationale: The figure defines the static and dynamic envelopes that the iLIDS 
must adhere to for host vehicle integrations and operations.  The figure also 
establishes an EVA KOZ that is used for the exclusion of EVA requirements. 
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3.2.3 Environmental 
[R.LIDS.0027] iLIDS Thermal and Induced Environments 
The iLIDS shall meet all of its functional and performance requirements during and after 
exposure to the loads defined in JSC-65970, iLIDS Thermal and Induced Environments 
(iLIDS TIES). 
Rationale: The iLIDS will meet the loads defined in JSC-65970, iLIDS TIES.  
JSC-65970 contains loads for launch, in-flight, docking/berthing, structural limits, and 
postcapture, thermal, among others.  JSC-65970 will specify which loads are 
functional during and/or after vs. survival only. 
[R.LIDS.0104] Environmental Qualification and Acceptance Testing 
The iLIDS shall comply with SSP 41172, Qualification and Acceptance Environmental 
Test Requirements, for environmental certification testing. 
Rationale: The SSP 41172 standard contains both qualification and 
acceptance testing requirements for natural and induced environments as well as 
minimum design screening requirements that are beyond the expected 
environments.  As with other design and construction standards, SSP 41172 will 
drive the design because the design must take into account that it will need to 
encompass a larger range of environments or minimum screening environments, 
whichever is greater, as part of the equipment's certification program.  Vehicle 
spacecraft equipment is required to meet specific requirements through qualification 
testing to Maximum Predicted Environments (MPE) with sufficient margin, durations, 
and workmanship standards.  Qualification testing demonstrates the design, 
manufacturing process, and acceptance program produce hardware/software that 
meet specification requirements with adequate tolerance. 
3.2.3.1 Thermal 
[R.LIDS.1051] Active Thermal System Control 
The iLIDS shall provide heater control for the docking system, which has controllable 
set points from the host. 
Rationale: Requiring the docking system to control its own heaters simplifies 
the electrical interface to the host.  Control set points allow for different hosts to set 
minimum temperature to correspond to host dew point requirements.  The docking 
system will define operational and survivability constraints.  Based on these 
constraints, the docking system will implement blankets and/or heaters as required.  
This requirement also fulfills JPR 8080.5 G-16. 
[R.LIDS.1141] Heater Operation - Blind Mode 
The iLIDS shall perform default heater operation when communications to the iLIDS 
heater controller is not available. 
Rationale: The blind mode heater operation is to maintain the iLIDS within the 
thermal survivability range when being stored or displaced.  The iLIDS heater 
controller will have default values preprogrammed into the controller.  If the controller 
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starts up with no communications, it will use the internal default values for set points.  
If the controller is operating normally and then loses communications, the last heater 
set points received will be used until another communications message is received 
or the heater controller is power-cycled. 
3.2.3.1.1 iLIDS-to-iLIDS Thermal Docking Interface 
[R.LIDS.5050] iLIDS-to-iLIDS Thermal Contact Conductance 
The iLIDS thermal contact conductance across the iLIDS-to-iLIDS docking interface 
shall be 15 Btu/hr-ft^2-°F (85 W/m2-K) to 50 Btu/hr-ft^2-°F (284 W/m2-K) for the metal-
to-metal contact area. 
Rationale: The iLIDS utilizes heaters to condition/maintain temperatures 
above the minimum limits for each operating mode. 
3.2.3.1.2 iLIDS-to-Vehicle Thermal Docking Interface 
[R.LIDS.5057] iLIDS-to-Host Vehicle Thermal Contact Conductance 
The thermal contact conductance across the iLIDS-to-host vehicle interface shall be 15 
Btu/hr-ft^2-°F to 50 Btu/hr-ft^2-°F for the metal-to-metal contact area 
Rationale: The iLIDS utilizes heaters to condition/maintain temperatures 
above the minimum limits for each operating mode. 
3.2.3.2 Pressure 
[R.LIDS.0101] Differential Pressure Limits 
The iLIDS shall function during and after exposure to the pressure differential of 15.95 
psi (1100 hPa). 
Rationale: The iLIDS must survive specified pressurized environments to 
ensure operations during design reference missions throughout its life.  This is also 
in accordance with JPR 8080.5, Standard MS-1, “Equipment containers or 
enclosures for use within pressurized compartments of spacecraft shall be designed 
to withstand rapid decompression of the spacecraft without yielding, fracturing, or 
sustaining damage.” 
[R.LIDS.0103] iLIDS Depress Rate 
The iLIDS shall survive a 0.76 psi/sec (5.24 kPa/sec) depressurization rate over the 
range of 15.2 psia (104.8 kPa) to 5.5E-12 psia (2.7E-10 Torr) without loss of 
functionality as specified herein. 
Rationale: The iLIDS must survive all specified natural and induced pressure 
to ensure operations during design reference missions throughout its life.  This is 
also in accordance with JPR 8080.5, Standard MS-1.  The 0.76 psi/sec is the same 
value in SSP 41004, Common Berthing Mechanism to Pressurized Elements 
Interface Control Document (ICD). 
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[R.LIDS.1118] iLIDS Repress Rate 
The iLIDS shall survive a 0.30 psi/sec (2.07 kPa/sec) repressurization rate over the 
range of 5.5E-12 psia (2.7E-10 Torr) to 15.2 psia (104.8 kPa) without loss of 
functionality as specified herein. 
Rationale: The iLIDS must survive all specified natural and induced pressure 
to ensure operations during design reference missions throughout its life.  This is 
also in accordance with JPR 8080.5, Standard MS-1.  The 0.30 psi/sec is the same 
value in SSP 41004, Common Berthing Mechanism to Pressurized Elements 
Interface Control Document (ICD). 
3.2.3.3 Vibration 
The iLIDS acceleration requirements are decomposed in [R.LIDS.0027] by meeting all 
functional and performance requirements during and after exposure to the loads defined 
in JSC-65970, iLIDS Thermal and Induced Environments (iLIDS TIES). 
3.2.3.4 Acceleration 
The iLIDS acceleration requirements are decomposed in [R.LIDS.0027] by meeting all 
functional and performance requirements during and after exposure to the loads defined 
in JSC-65970, iLIDS Thermal and Induced Environments (iLIDS TIES). 
3.2.3.5 Shock 
The iLIDS acceleration requirements are decomposed in [R.LIDS.0027] by meeting all 
functional and performance requirements during and after exposure to the loads defined 
in JSC-65970, iLIDS Thermal and Induced Environments (iLIDS TIES). 
3.2.3.6 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility 
[R.LIDS.0100] Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility 
The iLIDS shall be designed to meet requirements in JSC-65842, iLIDS 
Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Description Document. 
Rationale: This requirement adheres to approved standards. 
3.2.3.7 Humidity 
[R.LIDS.1077] Humidity Limits 
The iLIDS shall meet specified performance following exposure 0 to 98 percent relative 
humidity during ground stowage and processing operations. 
Rationale: Refer to the launch site values for humidity in NSTS 07700 Vol. X, 
Space Shuttle Flight and Ground System Specification Book 2, Environment Design, 
Weight, and Performance, and Avionics Events Table 11.10.9 and Figure 11.10-5. 
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3.2.3.8 Acoustic Emissions 
[R.LIDS.1074] Acoustic Emission Limits 
The iLIDS shall limit acoustic emissions to the limits as defined in SSP 50005, 
International Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), 
Section 5.4. 
Rationale: This is in accordance with approved standards.  Acoustic limits are 
only applicable to a crewed vehicle condition with hatches closed.  The iLIDS is not 
a source of acoustic noise when docked and unpowered. 
3.2.3.9 Meteoroids and Orbital Debris 
[R.LIDS.0295] iLIDS MMOD - Short Duration 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall provide a Probability of No Penetration (PNP) of 
0.999983 or greater during 210 days docked with the ISS when exposed to the MMOD 
environments as defined in NASA/TP-2002-210780 for orbital debris and SSP 30425, 
Space Station Program Natural Environment Definition for Design for meteoroids. 
Rationale: The system will be exposed to a variety of natural and induced 
environments that may pose a threat to functionality and performance, and therefore 
must be taken into account in the design.  The PNP is based on the exposed surface 
area of the iLIDS with 210 days of exposure while docked at the ISS.  The surface 
area assumes standoff shielding on the iLIDS outer diameter.  Penetration is defined 
as a through-hole in the pressure shell or detached spall from the inside surface of 
the pressure shell such that hazardous debris is generated within the pressurized 
volume.  This requirement does not account for failures resulting from MMOD strikes 
on other components or during unmated operations.  These failure probabilities will 
be presented as technical risks and accounted for in hazard reports.  The -302 has a 
longer life and therefore a different PNP number. 
[R.LIDS.1111] iLIDS (-302) MMOD 
The iLIDS (-302) shall provide a MMOD shield mounting interface as defined in JSC-
65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS (-302) Host-Provided MMOD Interface. 
Rationale: The system will be exposed to a variety of natural and induced 
environments that may pose a threat to functionality and performance, and therefore 
must be taken into account in the design.  This requirement is for providing the 
interface only; the MMOD shield and PNP will be provided by the host vehicle. 
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3.2.3.10 Atomic Oxygen 
[R.LIDS.1088] Atomic Oxygen 
The iLIDS shall withstand the nominal ram Atomic Oxygen (AO) fluence of 5.0 x 10E21 
oxygen atoms/cm2 per year to exposed ram surfaces for missions. 
Rationale: The AO environment is applicable to iLIDS internal surfaces and 
equipment exposed to the external AO environment in the absence of a docked 
vehicle.  The maximum short-term: 4.4 x 10E19 oxygen atoms/cm2 per day for 30 
days or less.  Values are derived from the natural environment definition given in 
SSP 30425, Space Station Program Natural Environment Definition for Design. 
3.2.3.11 External Contamination 
NASA Materials and Processes Division (ES4) material experts have reviewed the 
iLIDS and determined that the contamination requirements are not applicable to docking 
systems.  Contamination requirements are intended for systems such as photovoltaic 
(PV) arrays, radiators, optical GN&C instruments, windows, etc. 
3.2.3.12 Ionizing Radiation 
[R.LIDS.0183] Ionizing Radiation 
The iLIDS shall meet specified performance requirements when exposed to the 
radiation dose environment in accordance with JSC-64598, iLIDS Ionizing Radiation 
Control Plan. 
Exception:  The iLIDS (-301 & -302) shall meet radiation hardness levels for Single 
Event Upsets (SEUs), Single Event Latch-up (SEL), Single Event Gate Rupture 
(SEGR), and Single Event Burn-Out (SEB) to a minimum True Linear Energy Transfer 
(LET) = TBS-218. 
Rationale: The iLIDS must meet ionizing radiation requirements.  This 
document establishes the ionizing radiation design susceptibility environment for low 
earth orbit and lunar environments. 
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3.2.3.13 Lightning 
[R.LIDS.5033] Command and Data Handling Interface, Physical Layer Safe 
Operation Area 
The iLIDS TIA-422-B Command and Data Handling (C&DH) interface shall be protected 
against lightning transients to the limits as defined in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure Safe 
Operation Area for TIA-422-B C&DH Serial Port. 
Rationale: The host vehicle protects the iLIDS from primary lightning effects 
(i.e., lightning direct current path) and limits secondary effects on the TIA-422-B 
C&DH interface to levels compliant with the Safe Operation Area curves 
documented in JSC-65795, NDS IDD.  The curves were computed for the iLIDS TIA-
422-B Transient Voltage Suppressor (TVS) using ARP5412, Double Exponential 
Current Waveform 1.  Open circuit voltage and short circuit current refer to the circuit 
parameters at the iLIDS host connector. 
3.2.3.14 Solar Ultraviolet Radiation 
[R.LIDS.1138] Solar Ultraviolet Radiation (Excluding -302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall meet all of its functional and performance requirements 
during and after exposure to the solar ultraviolet radiation (UV) environment as defined 
in SSP 30425, Space Station Program Natural Environment Definition for Design, 
Section 7.2 with the limit to not to exceed 214 Equivalent Sun Hours (ESH) (TBR-212) 
ultraviolet radiation (for a duration of up to 21 days). 
Rationale: The iLIDS must operate in the solar ultraviolet radiation 
environment.  The limits are based on restrictions for the iLIDS seal exposure to 
ESH and UV. 
[R.LIDS.1139] Solar Ultraviolet Radiation (-302) 
The iLIDS (-302) shall meet all of its functional and performance requirements during 
and after exposure to the solar ultraviolet radiation environment as defined in SSP 
30425, Space Station Program Natural Environment Definition for Design, Section 7.2. 
Rationale: The iLIDS must operate in the solar ultraviolet radiation 
environment. 
3.2.3.15 Vacuum 
[R.LIDS.1140] Vacuum Environment 
The iLIDS shall be fully functional while exposed to the ambient pressure of 1.0E-11 
Pascal. 
Rationale: Value is derived from the natural environment definition given in 
SSP 30425, Space Station Program Natural Environment Definition for Design.  This 
is the vacuum environment for geosynchronous environment. 
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3.2.4 Reliability 
[R.LIDS.0113] Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Item List 
A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) shall be performed on each level of the 
iLIDS assembly for each required environmental condition and for each operational and 
abort mode per SSP 30234, Instructions for Preparation of Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) for Space Station. 
Rationale: This requirement adheres to approved standards 
3.2.4.1 Failure Tolerance 
[R.LIDS.0106] Catastrophic Hazard Fault Tolerance 
The iLIDS shall be designed such that no combination of two failures, or two operator 
errors, or one of each can result in a disabling or fatal personnel injury, or loss of the 
ISS, unless controlled by Design For Minimum Risk (DFMR).  Compliance with this 
requirement may be accomplished at the iLIDS level or through a combination of hazard 
controls at the integrated Visiting Vehicle (VV) and/or ISS levels. 
Rationale: Compliance with ISS program safety requirements.  Verification of 
this requirement may be satisfied via a combination of hazard controls at the iLIDS 
level and at the integrated-system level (including both the VV and ISS).  In areas 
where the iLIDS cannot meet this requirement alone, the required integrated hazard 
controls will be documented as an interface requirement in the appropriate ICD/IDD, 
and the hazard reports will reference those requirements as appropriate.  Personnel 
considered include all flight and ground crews. 
[R.LIDS.0107] Critical Hazard Fault Tolerance 
The iLIDS shall be designed such that no single failure or single operator error can 
result in a non-disabling personnel injury, severe occupational illness; loss of a major 
ISS element on-orbit life sustaining function or emergency system, unless controlled by 
DFMR.  Compliance with this requirement may be accomplished at the iLIDS level or 
through a combination of hazard controls at the integrated VV and/or ISS levels. 
Rationale: Compliance with ISS program safety requirements.  Verification of 
this requirement may be satisfied via a combination of hazard controls at the iLIDS 
level and at the integrated-system level (including both the VV and ISS).  In areas 
where the iLIDS cannot meet this requirement alone, the required integrated hazard 
controls will be documented as an interface requirement in the appropriate ICD/IDD, 
and the hazard reports will reference those requirements as appropriate.  Personnel 
considered include all flight and ground crews. 
[R.LIDS.1107] Failure Tolerance 
The iLIDS failure tolerances shall meet or exceed the allocations in the Failure 
Tolerance Allocation table for the identified functions. 
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Table 3.2-1 - Failure Tolerance Allocation  
End Item Function Failure Tolerance Allocation 
(A) (B) (C) (E) (F) (G) 
iLIDS (-301) iLIDS (-302) 
Unlatch hard capture hooks 2 1 
Achieve soft capture during docking 1 1 
Achieve hard capture during docking 1 1 
Hold cabin pressure while docked 1 (D, G) 1 (D,G) 
Charge separator springs 1 1 
Pass power and data between docked 
vehicles 
1 1 
Provide heater power  1 1 
Provide temperature sensing 1 1 
Provide MMOD protection 0 0 
Notes: 
(A) Maintenance may not be considered as a redundant path to meet these requirements. 
(B) Redundancy used to achieve failure tolerance may be similar or dissimilar. 
(C) Failure tolerance defined by requirements in R.LIDS.0106 and R.LIDS.0107. 
(D) Degraded performance allowed after one hook failure. 
(E) When the iLIDS functions are implemented using structure, the structure shall be exempted from failure 
tolerance requirements. 
(F) When the iLIDS functions are implemented via mechanisms, the mechanisms will be designed for 
minimum risk and considered to be single failure tolerant equivalent. 
(G) One fault tolerance on iLIDS is implemented via dual seals. 
 
 
Rationale: Fault tolerance improves safety and likelihood of mission success 
for missions involving iLIDS.  The levels of fault tolerance established are reflective 
of the design that resulted from mass and risk trades performed in the development 
of iLIDS for the Constellation program, as subsequently further tailored for the ISS 
program. 
3.2.4.2 Failure Propagation 
[R.LIDS.0108] Failure Propagation 
A single failure of the iLIDS shall preclude propagation of additional failures external to 
the failed end item. 
Rationale: This is a NASA standard reliability requirement. 
3.2.4.3 Failure Detection, Isolation, and Recovery 
[R.LIDS.0109] Failure Detection, Isolation, and Recovery 
The iLIDS shall provide Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR). 
Rationale: NPR 8705.2, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems, 
mandates FDIR for faults of human-rated systems that affect critical functions.  FDIR 
is required for crew safety and mission success because it enables the recovery of 
such critical functions.  In addition, fault detection enables crew abort or flight 
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termination (in case of nonrecoverable failures).  Fault isolation further enables 
common-mode failure identification, in-flight maintenance, and fleet supportability. 
3.2.5 Maintainability 
Reserved 
3.2.6 Transportability 
3.2.6.1 Ground Transportability 
The iLIDS ground transportability loads are decomposed in [R.LIDS.0027] by meeting 
all functional and performance requirements during and after exposure to the loads 
defined in JSC-65970, iLIDS Thermal and Induced Environments (iLIDS TIES). 
3.2.7 JPR 8080.5 - JSC Design and Procedural Standards 
[R.LIDS.1109] JPR 8080.5 - JSC Design and Procedural Standards 
The iLIDS shall meet JPR 8080.5, JSC Design and Procedural Standards requirements 
marked applicable, as specified in Appendix C. 
Rationale: Adherence to NASA standards.  JPR 8080.5, JSC Design and 
Procedural Standards provides design and procedural requirements for any human 
spaceflight program, project, spacecraft, system, or end item. 
3.3 Design and Construction 
[R.LIDS.1108.1] Fastener - Threaded Ends 
The iLIDS threaded ends of IVA and EVA screws and bolts extending more than 0.12 
in. shall be capped to protect against sharp threads. 
Rationale: This is to protect the crew from injury due to sharp edges in 
accordance with SSP 50005, International Space Station Flight Crew Integration 
Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Section 6.3.3.6. 
[R.LIDS.1108.2] Fastener - Maintenance Force 
iLIDS on-orbit maintainable IVA fasteners shall require no greater than 20 lbf for 
engagement or disengagement with ratchet-type tools. 
Rationale: The value accommodates the strength limitations of the 5th 
percentile male population, as stated by SSP 41000, System Specification for the 
International Space Station, Section 3.3.7.3.2, which is derived from SSP 50005, 
International Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), 
Section 4.9.3.B. 
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[R.LIDS.1108.3] Fastener - Maintenance Torque 
iLIDS on-orbit maintainable IVA fasteners shall require no greater than 11 ft-lb torque 
for engagement or disengagement with driver type tools. 
Rationale: The value accommodates the strength limitations of the 5th 
percentile male population as stated by SSP 41000, System Specification for the 
International Space Station, Section 3.3.7.3.2, which is derived from SSP 50005, 
International Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), 
Section 4.9.3.B. 
[R.LIDS.1108.4] IVA Toolbox Compatibility 
iLIDS mounting fasteners used on guide petals and electrical boxes shall be selected to 
be compatible with IVA tool box assembly part number SEG33113668-301. 
Rationale: This requirement adheres to approved standards to support on-
orbit maintenance.  The standard tool list is comprised of tools to be used for Orbital 
Replacement Unit (ORU) removal and replacement.  The IVA tool box is in 
accordance with JSC 28533, ISS Catalogue of IVA GFE FCE. 
[R.LIDS.1117] Fastener Integrity 
iLIDS fasteners shall be in accordance with JPR 8730.2, JSC Fastener Integrity Testing 
Program. 
Rationale: The iLIDS contains numerous safety-critical fasteners whose 
properties are crucial to the safe operation of the iLIDS.  Counterfeit or substandard 
fasteners could cause a structural failure of the iLIDS and result in a catastrophic 
hazard. 
3.3.1 Materials, Processes and Parts 
3.3.1.1 Materials and Processes 
[R.LIDS.0116] Flight Hardware 
Materials and processes for flight hardware shall meet the requirements of NASA-STD-
6016, Standard Material & Process Requirements for Spacecraft as implemented by 
JSC-27301, Materials Control Plan for JSC Flight Hardware. 
Rationale: The NASA standard covers generic Materials and Process 
requirements. The iLIDS will utilize JSC-27301, Materials Control Plan for JSC Flight 
Hardware as a specific implementation to meet NASA-STD-6016.  JSC-27301 also 
covers workmanship standards for mechanical and electrical hardware and 
implements SSP 30233, Space Station Requirements for Materials and Processes. 
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3.3.1.2 Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical Parts 
[R.LIDS.0120] Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical Parts Selection 
The iLIDS shall comply with the design requirements contained in JSC-64924, iLIDS 
Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Management and 
Implementation Plan. 
Rationale: This plan defines the requirements, processes and policies for an 
EEE Parts Control Program for the Project. 
[R.LIDS.5036] iLIDS-to-Host Vehicle Electrical Interface (Excluding -302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall provide electrical connections to the host vehicle as 
defined in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS (excluding -302) Tunnel Connections-to-
Host Vehicle Electrical Interface. 
Rationale: The vehicle interface has a separate connector for power and data, 
unlike the iLIDS umbilical interface, which combines power and data. 
[R.LIDS.5037] Host Interface Connector Pinouts 
The iLIDS shall comply with the Host Interface Connector Pinouts as defined in JSC-
65795, NDS IDD, Appendix F. 
Rationale: The vehicle interface has a separate connector for power and data, 
unlike the iLIDS umbilical interface, which combines power and data. 
[R.LIDS.5038] iLIDS Box Connections-to-Host Vehicle Electrical Interface 
(Excluding -302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall provide electrical connections to the host vehicle as 
defined in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS (excluding -302) Box Connections-to-Host 
Vehicle Electrical Interface. 
Rationale: The IDD figure defines the required host interfaces for both power 
and data to the iLIDS electrical boxes. 
3.3.2 Structural Design 
[R.LIDS.0124] Structural Design and Verification Requirements 
The iLIDS shall be designed and verified to meet the requirements of SSP 30559 
Structural Design and Verification Requirements. 
Exception:  SSP 30559, Section 3.1.9.3 (Dewars) and 3.1.9.7 (Burst Discs) are not 
applicable. 
Rationale: This requirement adheres to approved standards.  For launch and 
unmated cases, the shuttle factors of safety will be used. 
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[R.LIDS.0127] Fracture Control Design 
The iLIDS shall implement the fracture control requirements specified in NASA-STD-
5019, Fracture Control Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware. 
Rationale: Fracture control implementation is mandatory to ensure safety of 
the manned space systems.  Implementation of fracture control is necessary to 
prevent premature failure due to flaws.  The procedure for meeting these 
requirements is found in JSC-25863B, Fracture Control Plan for JSC Flight 
Hardware.  In the case of conflict, the technical requirements of NASA-STD-5019 
take precedence over the technical requirements cited in applicable documents or 
referenced guidance documents. 
[R.LIDS.0128] Mechanisms 
The iLIDS shall comply with Section 1 through Section 4 of NASA-STD-5017, Design 
and Development Requirements for Mechanisms. 
Rationale: This requirement adheres to approved standards. 
3.3.3 Nameplates and Product Marking 
[R.LIDS.0136] General Identification Marking Requirements 
The iLIDS shall use nameplates and product marking in accordance with PRC-9002, 
Process Specification for Part Marking. 
Rationale: This is in accordance with approved standards. 
[R.LIDS.0137] Nomenclature Plan 
iLIDS nameplates and product marking shall use operational nomenclature related to 
on−orbit operations, which shall conform to SSP 50254, Operations Nomenclature. 
Rationale: The iLIDS shall adhere to standards currently in use for ISS 
hardware markings.  Labeling applicable only to ground−based (nonoperational) 
functions may use other common technical terms.  This is in accordance with SSP 
50005, International Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-
3000/T), Section 9.5.3.1.2 (D). 
[R.LIDS.0286] Mounting/Alignment Labels/Codes 
The iLIDS shall be labeled or coded to identify proper mounting alignment. 
Rationale: Labels provide contextual information to help assure that ground 
crewmembers do not attempt to install an iLIDS incorrectly; such an attempt could 
damage the iLIDS or the interfaces to the vehicle.  Each iLIDS is verified for flight in 
its designed orientation and configuration. 
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3.3.4 Workmanship 
[R.LIDS.0294] Surface Cleanliness 
iLIDS surfaces shall at a minimum be Visibly Clean (VC) Sensitive in accordance with 
SN-C-0005, Contamination Control Requirements for the Space Shuttle Program upon 
delivery for integration. 
Rationale: The iLIDS may require a more stringent level of cleanliness if the 
installation has proximity or exposure to more sensitive surfaces.  Areas that are 
inaccessible in the final assembly and that may act as contamination sources while 
on-orbit shall be cleaned to the VC Sensitive level of JSC SN-C-0005, 
Contamination Control Requirements for the Space Shuttle Program before close–
out, as specified in SSP 30426, Space Station External Contamination Control 
Requirements, Section 3.2.1.1. 
[R.LIDS.0298] iLIDS-to-Vehicle Interface Seal Cleanliness 
The iLIDS-to-vehicle interface, seal gland, and seals shall at a minimum be Visibly 
Clean (VC) Highly Sensitive in accordance with SN-C-0005, Space Shuttle 
Contamination Control Requirements upon delivery for integration. 
Rationale: The ISS levies a minimum VC Sensitive level for Space Station 
components and user hardware per SSP 30426, Space Station External 
Contamination Control Requirements.  iLIDS-to-vehicle interface requires a higher 
VC Highly Sensitive level.  This requirement is in accordance with SN-C-0005, 
Space Shuttle Contamination Control Requirements, Table A.2. 
[R.LIDS.1093] iLIDS-to-iLIDS Interface Seal Cleanliness 
The iLIDS-to-iLIDS interface, seal gland, and seals shall at a minimum be Visibly Clean 
(VC) Highly Sensitive in accordance with SN-C-0005, Space Shuttle Contamination 
Control Requirements upon delivery for integration. 
Rationale: The ISS levies a minimum VC Sensitive level for Space Station 
components and user hardware per SSP 30426, Space Station External 
Contamination Control Requirements.  iLIDS-to-vehicle interface requires a higher 
VC Highly Sensitive level.  This requirement is in accordance with SN-C-0005, 
Space Shuttle Contamination Control Requirements, Table A.2. 
3.3.5 Human Engineering 
[R.LIDS.0158] Anthropometry 
The iLIDS internal hardware shall provide fit, access, reach, view, and operation of 
human-system interfaces in crew functional areas for unsuited crewmembers for the 5th 
percentile Japanese female to the 95th percentile American male anthropometric size 
measurement. 
Rationale: This requirement is in accordance with SSP 50005, International 
Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Section 3.3. 
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[R.LIDS.0159] Range of Motion 
Aspects of the iLIDS with which unsuited IVA crewmembers physically interact during 
planned tasks shall be within the ranges of motion provided in SSP 50005, International 
Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Figure 3.3.2.3.1-
1. 
Rationale: This requirement is in accordance with SSP 50005, International 
Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Section 3.3. 
3.3.5.3 Strength 
[R.LIDS.1084] Strength 
iLIDS internal hardware, which will have a crew interface under normal operations, shall 
accommodate the strength limitations of the 5th percentile American female in 
accordance with SSP 50005, International Space Station Flight Crew Integration 
Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Section 4.9. 
Rationale: This is in accordance with approved standards. 
3.3.5.4 Natural and Induced Environment 
[R.LIDS.0162] IVA Crew-Induced Loads 
The iLIDS internal structure shall meet requirements specified herein when exposed to 
IVA-crew induced loading as specified in SSP 50005, International Space Station Flight 
Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Section 8.8.3.3.b. 
Rationale: System components and hardware with which the crew interacts 
during nominal operations on-orbit must be able to withstand incidental contact by 
crewmembers without creating a hazard. 
3.3.5.5 IVA Crew Safety 
[R.LIDS.0185] Corners and Edges 
iLIDS corners and edges to which the IVA crew is expected to be exposed during 
normal operations shall be rounded, as specified in SSP 50005, International Space 
Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T) to protect the crew from 
injury due to sharp edges and corners. 
Rationale: This requirement is in accordance with SSP 50005, International 
Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Sections 
6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, 6.3.3.3, and 6.3.3.11.  The host vehicle is responsible for the -302 
passage cover.  Since implementation is unknown, all items located within the 
internal passageways of the -302 will be considered exposed and need to meet the 
sharp edge requirement. 
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[R.LIDS.0186] Loose Equipment 
Any iLIDS loose equipment, except for equipment with functional sharp edges, shall 
have corners and edges rounded, as specified in SSP 50005, International Space 
Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T) to protect the crew from 
injury due to sharp edges and corners. 
Rationale: This requirement is in accordance with SSP 50005, International 
Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Sections 
6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, 6.3.3.3, and 6.3.3.11. 
[R.LIDS.0187] Burrs 
Any iLIDS exposed surfaces accessible to IVA crew shall be smooth and free of burrs. 
Rationale: Removal of burrs can help to prevent personnel injury and damage 
to protective equipment from sharp edges during normal operations. 
[R.LIDS.0188] Pinch Points 
The iLIDS shall prevent pinch points from injuring the IVA crew. 
Rationale: Pinch points can cause injury to the crew, but may exist for the 
nominal function of equipment (i.e., equipment panels).  This may be avoided by 
locating pinch points out of the reach of the crew or providing guards to eliminate the 
potential to cause injury. 
[R.LIDS.0189] IVA Touch Temperature 
iLIDS surfaces, which are subject to IVA crewmember contact, shall meet the touch 
temperature requirements as specified in SSP 50021, Safety Requirements Document, 
Section. 3.3.6.12.1, Internal Volume Touch Temperature. 
Exception: IVA touch temperature limits may not be met for some time after the two 
vehicles have completed docking until the warm-up period is complete.  The warm-up 
period will be characterized in JSC 65795, NDS IDD. 
Rationale: iLIDS internal surface temperatures must be maintained within the 
touch temperature limits to prevent crewmember injury from continuous and 
momentary contact. 
[R.LIDS.0190] Labeling 
The iLIDS shall provide labels for crew interfaces, in accordance with SSP 50005, 
International Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T). 
Rationale: This is to allow for identification of relevant features. 
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[R.LIDS.0192] Language 
The iLIDS shall use text written in the American English language, as specified by 
Webster's New World Dictionary of American English. 
Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to ensure as much commonality 
and consistency as possible in written text (i.e., language and spelling) across 
vehicle subsystems and across ISS systems.  This will facilitate learning and 
minimize interface-induced crew error. 
[R.LIDS.1104] Crew Protection for Electrical Shock 
The iLIDS shall provide protection for the crew from electrical hazards in accordance 
with SSP 50005, International Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-
STD-3000/T), Section 6.4.3. 
Rationale: The crew must be protected from potentially catastrophic electrical 
shock from the iLIDS electrical systems.  This requirement is in accordance with 
SSP 50021, Safety Requirements Document, Section 3.3.6.8.2. 
[R.LIDS.1105] IVA Exposed Circular Holes 
Any exposed round or slotted holes on the iLIDS accessible to IVA crew that are 
uncovered shall be less than 0.4 in. or greater than 1.0 in. in diameter for equipment 
located inside iLIDS. 
Rationale: Holes should be sized either small enough to prevent crewmember 
finger entry or large enough such that crewmember fingers cannot be stuck or 
injured.  This requirement is in accordance with SSP 50005, International Space 
Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Section 6.3.3.4. 
3.3.6 Safety 
[R.LIDS.0197] Hazard Analysis and Safety Risk Assessment 
A safety hazard analysis and safety risk assessment shall be performed for the iLIDS, 
as specified in SSP 30309, Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Requirements 
Document. 
Rationale: The foremost consideration for resolving hazards, identified by the 
hazard analysis process, is to eliminate hazards by removing hazard sources and 
hazardous operations.  The methods for controlling critical and catastrophic hazards 
are failure tolerance and DFMR. 
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[R.LIDS.1092] Control System Safety Requirements 
The iLIDS shall be designed in accordance with SSP 50038, Computer-Based Control 
System Safety Requirements. 
Rationale: Compliance with ISS program safety requirements.  Verification of 
this requirement may be satisfied via a combination of hazard controls at the iLIDS 
level and at the integrated-system level (including both the VV and ISS).  In areas 
where the iLIDS cannot meet this requirement alone, the required integrated hazard 
controls will be documented as an interface requirement in the appropriate ICD/IDD, 
and the hazard reports will reference those requirements as appropriate.  Personnel 
considered include all flight and ground crews. 
[R.LIDS.1102] Design For Minimum Risk 
iLIDS hazards related to DFMR areas of design shall be controlled by the safety-related 
properties and characteristics of the design.  The failure tolerance criteria are only to be 
applied to these designs as necessary to ensure that credible failures that may affect 
the design do not invalidate the safety-related properties of the design. 
Rationale: This requirement is in accordance with SSP 41000, System 
Specification for the International Space Station, Section 3.3.6.1.2.  DFMR are areas 
where hazards are controlled by specification requirements that specify safety-
related properties and characteristics of the design that have been baselined by the 
ISS program requirements rather than failure tolerance criteria.  The failure tolerance 
criteria of R.LIDS.0106 will only be applied to these designs as necessary to ensure 
that credible failures that may affect the design do not invalidate the safety-related 
properties of the design.  For example, a pressure vessel shall be certified safe 
based upon its inherent properties to withstand pressure loading that have been 
verified by analysis and qualification and acceptance testing; however, failure 
tolerance must be imposed upon external systems that might affect the vessel, such 
as a tank heater, to ensure that failures of the heater do not cause the pressure to 
exceed the Maximum Design Pressure (MDP) of the pressure vessel.  Examples are 
mechanisms, structures, glass, pressure vessels, pressurized lines and fittings, 
functional pyrotechnic devices, material compatibility, flammability, etc. 
[R.LIDS.1103] Pyrotechnic Operated Devices (Excluding -302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall provide pyrotechnic devices designed and tested to the 
requirements of JSC 62809, Human Rated Spacecraft Pyrotechnic Specification. 
Exception: Exception is taken to JSC 62809 Sections 3.1, 3.2.2, 3.6.18, 3.6.19, 3.6.20, 
3.6.24.1, 3.6.24.2, 3.6.24.3, 3.6.26.1, 4.1.3, 4.4.9, 4.5.1.6, 4.5.2.4, 4.5.2.5, 7.3.3, 7.3.4, 
8.1, 8.2, 8.2.4, 8.3 to 8.3.6, 8.4.7, 8.5.1, and 8.5.2.  Sections noted are not verifiable by 
the iLIDS project. 
Rationale: iLIDS pyrotechnic devices must meet pyrotechnic requirements to 
ensure safe pyrotechnic design and operation.  This requirement is in accordance 
with SSP 50021, Safety Requirements Document, Section 3.3.6.5.1.3. 
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[R.LIDS.1106] Verifiable Seal Leakage Paths 
The iLIDS project shall provide for redundancy and verifiability requirements for leak 
paths through the pressurized module to the external environment in accordance with 
the criteria listed in the Seal Redundancy and Verifiability Requirements table. 
Table 3.3-1 - Seal Redundancy and Verifiability  
Seal Redundancy and verifiability requirements 
2,3,4,5 
D<= 6.0 in. D> 6.0 in. 
Feed-through connections1 A B 
Host vehicle Interface A B 
Docking A B 
Notes: 
(1) Includes valves, gages, transducers, etc. 
(2) D = Major diameter of the seal 
(3) A = Interface shall have two seals.  The interface shall be verifiable prior to 
launch. 
(4) B = Interface shall have two seals.  Each seal shall be verifiable prior to launch.   
(5) The interface may be verified in flight after docking via vestibule pressurization 
and leak check prior to hatch opening. 
Rationale: This requirement is derived from SSP 50021, Safety Requirements 
Document, section 3.2.2.7, but removes the requirement for on-orbit individual seal 
leakage verification for seals with a diameter greater than 6 in.; the requirement was 
tailored to be consistent with current docking and berthing operations on the ISS. 
3.3.7 Operational Lifetime 
[R.LIDS.0201] On-Orbit Design Life - Long Duration (-302) 
The iLIDS (-302) shall be designed to meet a minimum of 15 years of low earth orbit 
design life without maintenance. 
Rationale: The current manifest shows a 10-year ISS life after CDA delivery.  
In order to avoid recertification in the event of ISS life extension, iLIDS (-302) will 
certify to 15 years.  This equates to a Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) of 15 years. 
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[R.LIDS.0202] iLIDS On-Orbit Design Life without Maintenance - Short 
Duration (Excluding -302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall be designed to meet a minimum of 231 days of low 
earth orbit design life with no maintenance. 
Rationale: The 231 days are as follows: 
a. Unmated operations on-orbit: 21 days 
- Ultraviolet exposure not to exceed 214 equivalent sun hours 
(TBR-212) 
b. Mated mission duration: 210 days 
[R.LIDS.0203] Shelf Life 
The iLIDS shall be designed to meet a minimum 5-year shelf life. 
Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to specify a minimum life prior to 
required maintenance.  The shelf life is derived from the longest time between 
manufacture and delivery of the iLIDS.  This will be verified by the Limited Life Item 
List (LLIL). 
[R.LIDS.0206] iLIDS Passive Mode Docking/Undocking Cycles 
The iLIDS shall be capable of a minimum of 70 passive mode docking/undocking 
operations. 
Rationale: This includes 20 ground operations and 50 flight cycles.  Fifty 
cycles is calculated by a 15-year life with 3 missions per year and a margin of 5.  
The cycles are defined as a full docking/undocking sequence.  The 70 Passive mode 
docking/undocking cycle operations does not account for component-level cycles 
(i.e., flex-drive, actuators, etc.). 
[R.LIDS.0207] Launch 
The iLIDS shall be designed to meet a minimum of one launch. 
Rationale: The iLIDS must survive the minimum cycles for launch in order to 
meet operational life.  Launch includes one Earth launch. 
[R.LIDS.1060] iLIDS Active Mode Docking/Undocking Cycles (Excluding -302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall be capable of a minimum of 24 active mode 
docking/undocking operations. 
Rationale: This includes 20 ground operation cycles and 4 flight cycles.  The 
cycles are defined as a full docking/undocking sequence.  The 24 active mode 
docking/undocking cycle operations does not account for component-level cycles 
(i.e., flex-drive, actuators, etc.). 
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3.3.8 Electrical Parts and System Design, Construction, and Verification 
[R.LIDS.1120] iLIDS Electrical Boxes 
iLIDS electrical boxes shall include captive fasteners. 
Rationale: This is to allow the electrical boxes to be compatible with potential 
IVA replacement.  However, IVA replacement must be considered on a case-by-
case basis depending on integration with the host vehicle. 
[R.LIDS.1126] Host Electrical Power Interface - Modularity 
The iLIDS shall allow for reconfiguration to alternate host vehicle power values. 
Rationale: An electrical power interface is needed to allow the host vehicle to 
power the iLIDS.  This is the power for iLIDS consumption, which is not to be 
confused with the host vehicle pass-through power to the mating vehicle.  Host 
vehicles may operate with different nominal power configurations (e.g., 28 Vdc, 120 
Vdc, etc.).  This requirement allows for a modular power system to accommodate 
multiple hosts.  The host vehicle power must be specified at the time of the delivered 
docking system buildup; the system cannot accept multiple power configurations at 
the same time. 
3.4 Logistics 
3.4.1 Maintenance 
3.4.1.1 On-Orbit Maintenance 
No on orbit maintenance is planned; however, refer to R.LIDS.1108.1 through 
R.LIDS.1108.4 and R.LIDS.1120 for requirements on captive fasteners to support 
potential on-orbit replacement of electrical boxes. 
3.4.1.2 Ground Maintenance 
[R.LIDS.0229] Tool Clearance 
The iLIDS shall provide tool clearances for tool installation and actuation for all tool 
interfaces during ground maintenance. 
Rationale: No further rationale is required. 
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4 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS 
4.1 Ground Support Equipment Interface Definition 
The iLIDS incorporates the following interfaces to GSE: 
• Power 
• C&DH 
• Structural/Mechanical - The iLIDS-to-GSE interface is illustrated in the iLIDS-to-
GSE Interface Diagram figure. 
 
Figure 4.1-1 - iLIDS to GSE Interface Diagram  
[R.LIDS.0043] GSE Command and Data Handling Interface 
The iLIDS shall provide a unique C&DH interface for GSE separate from the host 
vehicle interface to allow ground check-out and testing. 
Rationale: A separate interface is needed to allow check-out of the system 
after installation on the host vehicle.  This allows for docking system evaluation 
without requiring the host vehicle's computer system. 
[R.LIDS.0044] Structural Interface 
The iLIDS shall provide a structural interface for GSE. 
Rationale: An interface between the iLIDS and GSE is needed during ground 
testing. 
iLIDS 
iLIDS GSE 
Structural/Mechanical 
Comm & Data 
Power 
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4.2 GSE Requirements 
4.2.1 General 
[R.LIDS.1083] General 
All iLIDS GSE shall conform to NASA-STD-5005, Ground Support Equipment. 
Rationale: These NASA standards for GSE and GSE hardware must be 
maintained and controlled as Class I.  The standards ensure that uniform 
engineering practices, methods, and essential criteria are employed in the design of 
GSE used within NASA. 
4.2.2 Ground Support and Transportation 
4.2.3 Ground Crew Interfaces 
[R.LIDS.0256] Labeling 
The iLIDS, including iLIDS GSE, shall provide labels for ground crew interface controls 
and indicators. 
Rationale: This is in accordance with SSP 50005, International Space Station 
Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Section 9.5.3.1. 
[R.LIDS.0259] Hazards Labeling 
The iLIDS GSE shall provide labels to identify hazards to ground crew or to equipment. 
Rationale: Hazard labeling shall be verified by inspection.  The inspection shall 
identify the list of equipment that is susceptible to damage or constitutes a hazard to 
the ground crew.  This list will include the type of hazard [Electrostatic Discharge 
(ESD), chemical, pressurized fluid, etc.].  The verification shall be considered 
successful when the inspection shows that all items on the list have been labeled 
with hazard information. 
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5 PREPARATION FOR DELIVERY 
5.1 Preservation 
5.1.1 General Preservation Requirements 
Preservation methods shall include the application of protective measures and materials 
to maintain the item within the appropriate cleanliness levels and to prevent damage or 
degradation in reliability or performance of the item when exposed to the natural and 
induced ground based and transportation and ground handling environments. 
The requirement for preservation method and level of protection shall be in accordance 
with MIL-STD-2073-1 and MIL-STD-2073-2. 
5.2 Packing 
5.2.1 General Packing Requirements 
Packing should include military standard and special design containers used for the 
transportation and storage of the item. 
Packing should be used in conjunction with the appropriate preservation methods, 
handling procedures, and methods of transport to prevent damage or degradation in 
reliability or performance of the item when exposed to the natural and induced ground 
based and transportation and ground handling environment. 
Packing should be in accordance with MIL-STD-2073-2, 5.6 and SSP 50005, 11.12.3. 
5.2.2 Detailed Packing Requirements 
The specific details relating to unique preservation, handling, and packaging selection 
should be reflected in the Sustaining Engineering Plan for mission essential items, 
Oversized Flight Element Transportation Plans, and corporate internal procedures. 
5.3 Marking and Labeling 
5.3.1 General Marking and Labeling Requirements 
5.3.1.1 Unit Packages, Intermediate Packages, and Exterior Shipping 
Marking and labeling for shipment and storage for unit packages, intermediate 
packages, and exterior shipping containers shall be in accordance with MIL-STD-129 
and NPR 6000.1. 
5.3.1.2 Hazardous Materials 
The marking of containers and other packaging for shipment and storage of hardware 
containing or having hazardous material characteristics shall be in accordance with 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 49. 
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5.3.1.3 Detailed Marking and Labeling Requirements 
Specific and detailed marking and labeling requirements should be reflected in the 
Sustaining Engineering Plan, Oversized Flight Element Transportation Plans, 
engineering drawings, manufacturing planning papers, and corporate internal 
procedures. 
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6 CUSTOMER IMPOSED VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS   
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7 NOTES / ERRATA 
 
Ultraviolet Radiation:  The studies for ultraviolet (UV) exposure to seals and assumed 
mission scenario are still being conducted.  The definition for UV exposure will aid in 
defining the scaling factor for ESH per hour on orbit.  The scaling factor for ESH 
determines the period of time that the seal can face the sun without causing 
degradation of the seal.  UV exposure level is highly dependent on orientation of vehicle 
(alpha/beta) with respect to the sun (e.g., solar facing; local vertical, local horizontal 
(LVLH); edge-to-the-sun).  Worst case scenario of UV exposure is constrained by iLIDS 
seals and the ESH time.  See iLIDS requirements R.LIDS.0202, R.LIDS.1113, and 
R.LIDS.1138 for TBR-212 placeholder.  Estimated closure of open item is September 
2011. 
 
Berthing:  The development of the berthing requirements document is still in-work.  
iLIDS Berthing requirement R.LIDS.1001 has been added as a placeholder for the 
future Block 1 Upgrade and includes TBS-217 for the berthing requirements document 
number.  Estimated closure of open item is September 2011. 
 
Ionizing Radiation:  The 120V iLIDS configurations (-301 and -302) will take exception 
to the radiation hardness levels defined in JSC 64598, iLIDS Ionizing Radiation Control 
Plan.  EV will be tasked to determine a value for True LET to be applied to these 
configurations.  See requirement R.LIDS.0183 for TBS-218 placeholder. 
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APPENDIX A   ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
6-DOF Six Degrees of Freedom 
ANSI American National Standards Institute  
AO Atomic Oxygen 
AWG American Wire Gauge 
baud Symbol Rate 
Btu British Thermal Unit(s) 
C&DH Command and Data Handling 
CDA Common Docking Adapter 
CDR Critical Design Review 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CIL Critical Items List 
cm Centimeter(s) 
cm2 Square Centimeters 
°C Degrees Celsius 
°F Degrees Fahrenheit 
DC Direct Current 
DCN Document Change Notice 
DFMR Design for Minimum Risk 
DRM Design Reference Mission 
E3 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects  
EA3 Systems Architecture and Integration Office 
EAR Export Administration Regulations 
EEE Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical  
EMU Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
ES4 NASA Materials and Processes Division 
ESD Electrostatic Discharge  
ESH Equivalent Sun Hours 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
FDIR Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery 
FMEA Failure Modes and Effect Analysis  
FRAM Flight Releasable Attachment Mechanism 
ft-lb Foot Pound 
GFE Government Furnished Equipment  
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GN&C Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
GSE Ground Support Equipment  
H&S Health and Status 
HCS Hard Capture System 
hPa Hectopascal(s) 
Hz Hertz 
ICD Interface Control Document 
ID Identification 
IDD Interface Definition Document 
IDSS International Docking System Standard 
iLIDS International Low Impact Docking System 
in. Inch(es) 
ISS International Space Station 
IVA Intravehicular Activity  
JPR JSC Program Requirements 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
kilobaud  1000 baud 
kg Kilogram(s) 
kgf-m Kilograms Force per meter 
KOZ Keep Out Zone 
kPa Kilopascal(s) 
kPa/sec Kilopascals per Second 
lb Pound(s) 
lbf Pound-Force 
lbm Pound-Mass 
LET Linear Energy Transfer 
LIDS Low Impact Docking System 
LLIL Limited Life Item List 
LSAM Lunar Surface Access Module 
LSB Least Significant Bit 
LVLH Local Vertical Local Horizontal 
MDP Maximum Design Pressure 
MGA Mass Growth Allowance 
MIL Military 
mm Millimeter(s) 
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MMOD Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris 
MPE Maximum Predicted Environment 
ms Millisecond(s) 
MSID Measurement Stimulation Identification 
MTTF Mean Time to Failure 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDS NASA Docking System 
NDSP NASA Docking System Project 
NDT Non-Destructive Testing 
NPR NASA Processes and Requirements 
NRZ Non-Return to Zero 
NSI NASA Standard Initiator 
NT NASA Quality and Flight Equipment Division 
OA ISS Program Office 
ORU Orbital Replacement Unit 
PNP Probability of No Penetration 
psia Pounds per Square Inch Absolute 
psi Pounds per Square Inch 
psi/sec Pounds per Square Inch per Second 
PV Photovoltaic 
Pyro Pyrotechnic 
RMS Remote Manipulator System 
RTD Resistance Temperature Detector 
S&MA Safety and Mission Assurance 
SCS Soft Capture System 
SEB Single Event Burn-Out 
sec Second 
SEGR Single Event Gate Rupture 
SEL Single Event Latch-up 
SEU Single Event Upset 
STD Standard 
STS Space Transportation System 
TBD To Be Determined 
TBR To Be Resolved 
TBS To Be Specified 
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TIES Thermal and Induced Environments 
TMG Thermal Micrometeoroid Garment 
TPS Thermal Protection System 
TVS Transient Voltage Suppressor 
TX Transmit 
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter 
UV Ultraviolet 
V Volt 
VC Visibly Clean 
Vdc Volts Direct Current 
VM Verification Matrix 
VV Visiting Vehicle 
W Watt 
W-hr Watt-hours 
W/m2-K Thermal transmittance, transfer of heat (in watts) through one 
square meter of a structure divided by the difference in temperature 
across the structure. 
X Times 
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APPENDIX B   DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
Term Definition 
Active iLIDS An iLIDS (International Low Impact Docking System) that has 
electro-mechanical actuation controlled features such as linear 
actuators, motor driven hooks and electro-magnets.  An "Active 
iLIDS” can only interface with a “Passive iLIDS” (see definition of 
Passive iLIDS below in this table). 
Active Mode A functional mode of iLIDS.  An active iLIDS performs all capture 
and structural attachment to the passive iLIDS.  See definition of 
Passive Mode. 
Alignment Alignment is the function that allows iLIDS to compensate and 
correct to the proper orientation necessary for successful soft 
capture. 
Androgynous Hardware that does not have distinct male or female 
characteristics, all hardware are identical in form and function. 
Backout A dynamic process in which a maneuvering vehicle halts its 
approach to the target and separates along a controlled path 
(within the approach/departure corridor) to a planned, safe station 
keeping range.  A backout is normally followed by a resumed 
approach or breakout maneuver. 
Berth Mating method that allows connection of two vehicles with the 
assistance of a robotic arm or a Remote Manipulator System 
(RMS)-type device. 
Breakout A dynamic process in which a maneuvering vehicle alters its 
intercept approach to a target and separates with the intention of 
not immediately resuming the approach that day.  A second 
rendezvous is necessary to reestablish intercept conditions.  In 
emergency scenarios, the maneuvering vehicle may perform an 
emergency deorbit burn as part of the breakout sequence. 
Bulkhead A bulkhead is a partition inside a ship, aircraft, or large vehicle. 
Bulkhead Connectors The bulkhead connectors are those that pass through a 
pressurized bulkhead. 
Capture The use of a docking mechanism to bring an approaching vehicle 
from a free flight state to a physically connected state (but not fully 
constrained) with the mating vehicle.  Capture enables placement 
of the system in a controlled orientation in preparation for hard 
mate.  When captured, the system may be easily released and is 
typically unable to withstand its full mechanical loading 
environment. 
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Term Definition 
Catastrophic Hazard A catastrophic hazard is a condition that may cause loss of life or 
a permanently disabling injury.  It also includes a condition that 
may cause loss of vehicle, prior to completing its primary mission.  
For example, a hazard that could cause loss of Orion prior to 
rendezvous with the Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM) is 
considered catastrophic.  A hazard that may cause loss of Orion 
after crew evacuation, during a water landing, would not be 
considered catastrophic. 
CheckSum CheckSum is a value transmitted with a data stream, derived from 
the other elements in the data stream, and used to check for 
transmission errors in the data.  If the transmitted checksum differs 
from the one derived by the receiving computer, a transmission 
error has probably occurred and the transmission is repeated. 
Command A command is an instruction to a computer to carry out an 
operation. 
Command/Response 
Packet 
This is a message or part of a message packaged as a fixed-size 
segment of data for transmission through a computer network. 
Control Box The control box is an enclosure that houses a computer system. 
Control Pendant This is a handheld control box. 
Critical Hazard A critical hazard is a condition that may cause a severe injury or 
occupational illness, loss of mission, or major property damage to 
facilities, systems, or flight hardware, but does not meet the 
criteria of a catastrophic hazard. 
Demate Demating is a function that can be performed by one of either two 
methods:  undocking or unberthing.  Demated also signifies 
structural separation once undocking/unberthing operations are 
complete. 
Design Reference 
Mission (DRM) 
Typical mission scenario encompassing tasks that are most likely 
to drive the architecture system design requirements.  The DRMs 
are analyzed for all mission aspects from failure tolerance to 
hardware layout, software functionality, and design suitability. 
Dock Docking is the mating of two independently operating spacecraft 
or other systems in space, using independent control of the two 
vehicles’ flight paths and attitudes during contact and capture.  
Docking begins at the time of initial contact of the vehicles’ 
docking mechanisms and concludes when full rigidization of the 
interface is achieved. 
Extravehicular Activity 
(EVA) 
EVA operations are performed by suited crew outside the 
pressurized environment of a flight vehicle or habitat (during space 
flight or on a destination surface). 
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Failure Detection, 
Isolation, and 
Recovery (FDIR) 
Determining the occurrence of a fault/failure, determining what 
caused the fault/failure, and providing corrective action. 
Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) 
FMEA is the study of a system and the working relationships of its 
elements to determine ways in which failure can occur (failure 
modes), and the effects of each potential failure on the system 
element in which it occurs on other systems. 
Fault An anomalous condition of a system, which includes hardware and 
software. 
Fault Detection Determine and notify fault occurrence. 
Fault Tolerance Built-in capability of a system to perform as intended in the 
presence of specified hardware or software faults.  EVA, 
emergency systems, or emergency operations may not be used as 
a leg of fault tolerance. 
Ground Support 
Equipment (GSE) 
All equipment (implements, tools, test equipment devices, 
simulations, etc.) required on the ground to support appropriate 
ground testing or training. 
Hard Capture A hard capture is when two docking vehicles are structurally 
connected, sealing is complete, vestibule is ready for equalization 
and hatch is ready to open.  This is also the state when a vehicle 
or payload is rigidly attached to the capture mechanism and 
relative motion is fully constrained. 
Health and Status 
(H&S) 
This is information on subsystem performance and flight 
performance, including configuration data, vehicle state data, 
subsystem status, failures, hazards, and measured parameters 
outside of normal limits. 
Induced Environment Any form of matter or energy released, radiated or modified by one 
component or System that could impact or influence another 
component or System.  Includes radiated and reflected thermal 
energy; vibrations, aerodynamic, and shock loads; 
electromagnetic energy, Paschen discharge, arcing, glow 
discharge, spacecraft charging, and V x B voltages; debris; 
particulate and molecular contamination, waste water dumps; and 
reflections, glows, and other optical contamination. 
Intravehicular Activity 
(IVA) maintenance 
An IVA is corrective or preventive maintenance performed by the 
crew within the pressurized spacecraft during a mission. 
iLIDS See Definition in Sec. 3.1, and Sec. 3.1.1 of the document 
LIDS Low Impact Docking System acronym from heritage design still 
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Term Definition 
used in legacy data utilized in iLIDS project (e.g., Command 
labels, requirements ID's, etc.) 
Maintainable The ability of a system to be retained in or restored to a specified 
condition when maintenance is performed in a stated time interval, 
under stated conditions, and using stated procedures and 
resources.  Maintenance, preventative and corrective, may include 
identification, safing access, removal, replacement, restoration, 
and verification of functionality. 
Mating Mating is the mechanical connection of two vehicles, in space (via 
docking or berthing) or on the Earth, Moon, or Mars (via docking, 
berthing, or some other method).  When the mating is successfully 
accomplished, the two vehicles are hard-mated and mated 
operations commence. 
Mating Vehicle In rendezvous and proximity operations, the mating vehicle 
performs minimal, if any maneuvers. 
MMOD Shield MMOD Shield is made up of thin Aluminum, Nextel and Kevlar 
materials. The MMOD shield protects iLIDS from MMOD strikes. 
Orbital Replacement 
Unit (ORU) 
A piece of equipment that can be removed and replaced with a 
working spare by a user or operator during the mission. 
Passive iLIDS An iLIDS that has no electro-mechanical actuation controlled 
features. A “Passive iLIDS” can only interface with an “Active 
iLIDS.” (see definition of an Active iLIDS above in the Table) 
Passive Mode A functional mode of iLIDS.  A passive iLIDS allows the Active 
iLIDS to perform all capture and structural attachment to the 
passive iLIDS.  See definition of Active Mode. 
Seal Gland A machined groove into which a seal is installed. 
Soft Capture A soft capture is a iLIDS function where the electromagnets are 
used to attach mating mechanisms.  This is not structural mating, 
but the first level of attachment. 
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Special Processes Processes where the resulting output cannot be verified by 
subsequent monitoring or measurement. (e.g., deficiencies 
become apparent only after the product is in use or the service 
has been delivered).  Special processes include, but are not 
limited to, soldering, coating/painting, cleaning, non-destructive 
examinations, plating, welding, brazing. 
 
A defense industry consensus list of special processes  
NDT: Liquid Penetrant, Magnetic Particle, Ultrasonics, X-ray 
Heat Treating: For multiple Alloy Families: Stress Relieving, 
Annealing, Carburizing, Nitriding, Carbonitiriding, Ferritic 
Nitrocarburizing, Ion Nitriding, Vacuum Heat Treating, Vacuum Oil 
Quenching, Hardening, Induction Hardening, Furnace Brazing, Dip 
Brazing, Induction Brazing, Vacuum Furnace Brazing, Flame 
Hardening, Cryogenic Treatments, Hot Forming/Hot sizing, Die 
Quenching, Hipping, Hardness and Metallography to support the 
heat treating function 
 
Welding: Torch/Induction Manual Brazing, Flash Welding, Electron 
Beam Welding, Fusion Welding, Laser Welding, Resistance 
Welding, Friction/Inertia Welding, Diffusion Welding, Percussion 
Stud Welding. 
 
Coatings: Thermal Spray, Vapor Deposition, Cementation, 
Stripping, Coating Evaluations, Plating of Coated Parts, Heat 
Treating of Coatings 
 
Chemical Processing: Plating, Anodizing, Conversion/Phosphate 
Coatings, Paint and Dry Film Lubricants, Etch  
 
Materials Testing Laboratories: Chemical, Mechanical, 
Metallography & Microhardness, Hardness, Corrosion, Mechanical 
Test Specimen Preparation, Differential Thermal Analysis, X-Ray 
Diffraction, Coating Evaluations, Fastener Testing  
TBD Acronym for To Be Determined.  Inserting TBD indicates values or 
information have yet to be added, but will be determined prior to 
document baseline. 
TBR Acronym for To Be Resolved.  Inserting TBR indicates that the 
information provided is tentative and is subject to change, if 
approved by project and program. 
TBS Acronym for To Be Specified.  Inserting TBS indicates that the 
information provided is information that has yet to be added. 
TIA/EIA-422 ANSI/TIA/EIA-422-B specifies the electrical signaling 
characteristics of the data link. 
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Umbilical Systems This system provides a link or system of links to something 
essential. 
Undocking Demating of spacecraft or other elements in space using 
independent control of the two vehicles’ flight paths and attitudes 
during release.  Undocking is done without the assistance of a 
robotic arm or a Remote Manipulator System (RMS)-type device. 
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Table C-1 - Compliance Document Applicability 
JPR 8080.5 standards carry multiple requirements within each standard.  For standards that have “Partially Applicable” 
applied, the standard is decomposed into individual shall statements and a preceding number is applied to each shall 
statement within the standard starting with (1).   The numbering allows exception of individual sections of the JPR 8080.5 
standard as well as partial applicability. 
Standard Section Section Title Applicability Comments/Rationale Requirements 
JPR 8080.5 E-1 Mating Provisions for 
Electrical Connectors 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-2 Protection of Severed 
Electrical Circuits 
Not Applicable iLIDS conductors are not cut using guillotine 
devices. 
 
JPR 8080.5 E-3 Electrical and Electronic 
Devices Protection from 
Reverse Polarity and/or 
Other Improper Electrical 
Inputs 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-4 Electrical Connectors - 
Moisture Protection 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-5 Electrical Connectors - Pin 
Assignment 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-6 Corona Suppression Applicable Corona is applicable with the custom power supply 
design inside of the 120V iLIDS that has peak 
voltages of 300+V. 
 
JPR 8080.5 E-7 Electrical Components - 
Restrictions on Use 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-8 Electrical / Electronic 
Supplies and Loads - 
Verification Tests 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-9 Electrical Circuits - 
Deenergizing 
Requirement 
Not Applicable Vehicle level requirement.  
JPR 8080.5 E-10 Cleaning of Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-11 Protective Covers or Caps 
for Electrical Receptacles 
and Plugs 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-12 Electrical Connectors - 
Disconnection for Trouble-
Shooting and Bench 
Applicable   
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Standard Section Section Title Applicability Comments/Rationale Requirements 
Testing 
JPR 8080.5 E-13 Bioinstrumentation 
Systems - Crew Electrical 
Shock Protection 
Not Applicable iLIDS is not a Bioinstrumentation System.  
JPR 8080.5 E-14 Electrical Wire Harnesses 
-Acceptance Testing 
Partially Applicable E-14(3) is not applicable - No shipping cables.  
JPR 8080.5 E-15 Electrical Power 
Distribution - Overload 
Protection & Fault 
Propagation 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-16 Testing Protective 
Devices for Electrical and 
Electronic Circuits 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-17 Electrical and Electronic 
Piece Parts - Hermetic 
Construction 
Not Applicable Other functional requirements specified in the 
iLIDS PTRS will provide necessary protection from 
damage, the parts need not be hermetically sealed. 
 
JPR 8080.5 E-18 Circuitry for Automatic 
Shutdown of Launch 
Vehicle Engine(s) 
Not Applicable Reclassified as G-54.  
JPR 8080.5 E-19 Equipment Design - 
Power Transients 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-20 Electrostatic Discharge 
Protection of Electronic 
Equipment 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-21 Electrical Connectors Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 E-22 Ionizing Radiation Effects 
on Electronics 
Partially Applicable E-22(2),(4)&(5) are not applicable - iLIDS will not 
use suggested test levels and methods for MTBF 
and no similarity to be used. 
 
JPR 8080.5 E-23 Transistors - Selection of 
Types 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 E-24 Electrical Wire and Cable 
Acceptance Tests 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 E-25 Protecting Electrical 
Wires, Cables, Bundles, 
and Harnesses 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 F-1 Restriction Requirements 
- Pressurized 
Components 
Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 F-2 Water Separators in a 
Zero-Gravity Environment 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-3 Service Points - Positive 
Protection From 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
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Interchangeability of Fluid 
Service Lines 
JPR 8080.5 F-4 Ground Service Points - 
Fluid Systems 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-5 Fluid Lines - Separation 
Provisions 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-6 Temperature and 
Pressure Monitoring 
Requirements for 
Potentially Hazardous 
Reactive Fluids 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-7 Capping of Servicing and 
Test Ports not Required to 
Function in Flight 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-8 Fluid System Components 
Whose Function is 
Dependent on Direction of 
Flow - Protection Against 
Incorrect Installation 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-9 Spacecraft Venting - 
Induced Perturbing Forces 
Not Applicable iLIDS is not a spacecraft.  
JPR 8080.5 F-10 Nozzle and Vents - 
Protection Prior to Launch 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no relative hardware  
JPR 8080.5 F-11 Fluid Supplies - 
Verification Test 
Provisions 
Not Applicable iLIDS block1 has no fluid transfer requirements. 
This will be unverifiable. 
 
JPR 8080.5 F-12 Protection of Pressurized 
Systems from Damage 
Due to Pressurant 
Depletion -Support 
Equipment 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-13 Habitable Module 
Pressure - Venting 
Restriction 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-14 Crew Cabin Module 
Ventilating Fans - 
Protection From Debris 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 F-15 Separation of Hypergolic 
Reactants 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-16 Fluid Line Routing 
Installation 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-17 Cleanliness of Flowing 
Fluids and Associated 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
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Systems 
JPR 8080.5 F-18 Pressure Relief Valves - 
Standardization of 
Functional  Testing 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-19 Cleanliness Protection for 
Fluid Systems 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-20 Fluid Systems - 
Cleanliness 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-21 Purge Gases - Dew Point 
Requirements 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-22 Pressure Garments - 
Protection Against Failure 
Propagation 
Not Applicable Relative hardware doesn't exist on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 F-23 Qualification Fluid Not Applicable Reclassified as G-53.  
JPR 8080.5 F-24 Fluid Systems - Design for 
Flushing and Draining 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-25 Toxicity - Fluids Contained 
in Systems in the Crew 
Compartment 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 F-26 Atmosphere Pressure and 
Composition Control 
Not Applicable iLIDS is not a Spacecraft or habitable module.  
JPR 8080.5 F-27 Liquid or Gas Containers - 
Verification of Contents 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-28 Use of Halogen Method 
for Coolant System Leak 
Detection 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 F-29 Filter Protection of 
Sensitive Fluid 
Components 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 F-30 Pressure Relief for 
Pressure 
Vessels/Systems 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 G-1 Equipment Accessibility 
for Maintenance 
Partially Applicable G-1(4)&(5) are not applicable - iLIDS is not 
habitable. 
 
JPR 8080.5 G-2 Separation of Redundant 
Systems 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 G-3 Electrical and Fluid 
Systems Checkout 
Provisions 
Partially Applicable Applicable to only electrical systems, iLIDS (at this 
time) does not transfer any fluids. 
 
JPR 8080.5 G-4 Protection from Debris - 
Electrical & Mechanical 
Systems 
Partially Applicable G-4(4) is not applicable - no fluids in iLIDS. R.LIDS.0295 
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JPR 8080.5 G-5 Prevention of Debris - 
Electrical & Mechanical 
Systems. 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 G-6 Redundancy 
Requirements 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-7 Time Displays Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-8 Design for Redundancy 
Verification 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 G-9 Shatterable Material - 
Exclusion 
Not Applicable Shatterable materials are not consistent with the 
iLIDS design and functions. It is not foreseeable 
that iLIDS would include a shatterable material. 
 
JPR 8080.5 G-10 Parts identification Partially Applicable G-10 (3) is not applicable - beyond the capability of 
the iLIDS project 
 
JPR 8080.5 G-11 Procurement Document 
Identification for Human 
Spaceflight Items 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 G-12 Application of Previous 
Qualification Test Data 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no previous qualification data.  
JPR 8080.5 G-13 Shipping and Handling 
Protection for Spaceflight 
Hardware 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-14 Classification of Flight and 
Non-Flight Equipment 
Partially Applicable G-14(2) is not applicable - Nonflight equipment  
JPR 8080.5 G-15 Resolution of Flight 
Equipment 
Failures/Anomalies Prior 
to Launch 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 G-16 Operational Limits on 
Temperature-Controlled 
Equipment 
Applicable  R.LIDS.0091 
JPR 8080.5 G-17 Separate Stock for 
Spaceflight Parts and 
Materials 
Applicable  R.LIDS.0136 
JPR 8080.5 G-18 Safety Precautions - Test 
and Operating Procedures 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 G-19 Special Processes- 
Identification of Drawings 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 G-20 Spacecraft Equipment - 
Protection from Liquids 
During Ground Operations 
Not Applicable No plan to locate iLIDS where it is subject to liquid 
leaks 
 
JPR 8080.5 G-21 Spacecraft Equipment - 
Moisture Protection 
Applicable  R.LIDS.1077 
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Standard Section Section Title Applicability Comments/Rationale Requirements 
JPR 8080.5 G-22 Parts Identification Applicable  R.LIDS.0136, 
R.LIDS.0137 
JPR 8080.5 G-23 Pressure Garment Wiring 
- Ignition of Materials by 
Electrical Current 
Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 G-24 Protecting Flight 
Equipment From Support 
Equipment 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 G-25 Thermal Design and 
Analysis 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 G-26 Internally Generated 
Radiation 
Not Applicable No laser sources on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 G-27 Fire control Partially Applicable G-27(2) & (3) not applicable - iLIDS does not 
provide fire detection or suppression capability. 
 
JPR 8080.5 G-28 Sealing - Solid Propellant 
Rocket Motors 
Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 G-29 Reentry Propulsion 
Subsystem In-Flight Test 
Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 G-30 Switch Protection Devices Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-31 Detachable Crew-
Operated Actuating Tools 
Not Applicable No on-orbit maintenance  
JPR 8080.5 G-32 Measurement Systems 
That Display Flight 
information to the Crew -  
Indication of Failure 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-33 Surface Temperatures Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-34 Extravehicular Activity 
Electronic Connectors 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-35 Enclosure Panels External 
to the Habitable Modules 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-36 Thermal Blankets - 
Extravehicular Activity 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-37 Verification of External 
Visibility 
Not Applicable iLIDS is not a crewed spacecraft.  
JPR 8080.5 G-38 Pressurization Or 
Repressurization- 
Preventing Ingress of 
Undesirable Elements 
Not Applicable iLIDS is not a crewed spacecraft.  
JPR 8080.5 G-39 Lightning Protection 
Design 
Not Applicable iLIDS is not a spacecraft.  
JPR 8080.5 G-40 Radioactive Luminescent 
Devices 
Not Applicable No radioactive materials on iLIDS.  
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JPR 8080.5 G-41 Acoustic Noise Criteria Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-42 Solar Wind Environment Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-43 Centralized Subsystem 
Controls 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-44 Attitude Control Authority Not Applicable Vehicle requirement.  
JPR 8080.5 G-45 Solid Propellant Rocket 
Motors 
Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 G-46 Separation Sensing 
System - Structural 
Deformation 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 G-47 Gyroscopes - Verification 
of Operational Status 
Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 G-48 Onboard Experiments - 
Required Preinstallation 
Checklist 
Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 G-49 Temperature and 
Pressure Monitoring 
Requirements of 
Hydrogen Peroxide 
System 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 G-50 Direct Procurement of 
Parts 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 G-51 Flight Hardware - 
Restriction on Use for 
Training 
Not Applicable Non-functional requirement.  
JPR 8080.5 G-52 Reuse of Flight Equipment Not Applicable iLIDS is not intended to be reused.  
JPR 8080.5 G-53 Reverification Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 G-54 Automatic Shutdown of 
Launch Vehicle 
Engines(S) 
Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 MP-1 Materials And Processes 
Control 
Applicable  R.LIDS.0116 
JPR 8080.5 MP-2 Flammability of Wiring 
Material 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-3 Toxicity of Materials Used 
in Crew Compartments - 
Wire Insulation, Ties, 
Identification Marks, and 
Protective Covering 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-4 Metals and Metal Couples 
- Restriction on Use 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-5 Solutions Which Contain Not Applicable Cancelled  
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Ethylene Glycol - 
Requirements for Silver 
Chelating Agent 
JPR 8080.5 MP-6 Toxicity - Requirements 
for Nonmetallic Materials 
Proposed for Use within 
Crew Compartment 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-7 Material Detrimental to 
Electrical Connectors 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-8 Leak Detectors - Wetting 
Agents 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-9 Mercury Limitations in 
Breathable Atmospheres 
Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 MP-10 Liquid Locking 
Compounds - Restrictions 
and Controls 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-11 Pressure Vessel 
Documentation 
Not Applicable iLIDS is not a pressure vessel.  
JPR 8080.5 MP-12 Multilayer Blanket Bake-
Out 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-13 Pressure Vessel / Special 
Pressurized Equipment 
Design and Certification 
Not Applicable iLIDS contain no relevant hardware.  
JPR 8080.5 MP-14 Silicate Ester Coolant 
System Design 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-15 Mercury - Restriction on 
Use 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-16 Restriction on Coatings for 
Areas Subject to Abrasion 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-17 Radiographic Inspection 
of Brazed and Welded 
Tubing Joints 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-18 Etching Fluorocarbon 
Insulated Electrical Wire 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-19 Spacecraft Material - 
Restriction on Use of 
Polyvinyl Chloride 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-20 Titanium or its Alloys - 
Prohibited Use with 
Oxygen 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-21 Beryllium - Restricted Use 
within Crew 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
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Compartment(s) 
JPR 8080.5 MP-22 Brazed Joints - 
Identification Marks 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-23 Pressure Vessels - 
Materials Compatibility 
and Vessel Qualification 
Test 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-24 Cadmium - Restriction on 
Use 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-25 Pressure Vessels - Non-
destructive Evaluation 
Plan 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MP-26 Repair of Sandwich - Type 
Structures 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MS-1 Equipment containers - 
Design for Rapid 
Spacecraft 
Decompression 
Applicable  R.LIDS.0027, 
R.LIDS.0101, 
R.LIDS.0103 
JPR 8080.5 MS-2 Alignment, Adjustment, 
and Rigging of Mechanical 
Systems 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 MS-3 Wire bindles - Protective 
Coating 
Not Applicable Reclassified as E-25  
JPR 8080.5 MS-4 Crew Hatches Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 MS-5 Threaded Fasteners Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 MS-6 Exposed Sharp Surfaces 
or Protrusions 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MS-7 Windows and Glass 
Structure 
Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 MS-8 Penetration of Inhabited 
Spacecraft Compartments 
Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
JPR 8080.5 MS-9 Positive Indication of 
Status for Mechanisms 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 MS-10 Functional Doors That 
Operate in Flight 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MS-11 Meteoroid and Orbital 
Debris Protection Levels 
for Structures 
Not Applicable iLIDS will not be performing MMOD impact updates 
to risk assessments based on unknown mission 
profiles.  iLIDS requirement [R.LIDS.0295] carries a 
specific PNP value relayed to host vehicle and 
mission profile. 
 
JPR 8080.5 MS-12 Spacecraft Recovery 
Hoist Loops 
Not Applicable No relative hardware on iLIDS.  
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JPR 8080.5 MS-13 Lifting and Hoisting 
Ground Support 
Equipment Identification 
Not Applicable Cancelled  
JPR 8080.5 MS-14 Structural Analysis Applicable  R.LIDS.0027 
JPR 8080.5 MS-15 Fluid Systems - Method of 
Joining Metallics 
Not Applicable iLIDS has no fluid transfer requirements.  
JPR 8080.5 MS-16 Pressure Vessels - 
Negative Pressure 
Damage 
Not Applicable iLIDS is not a pressure vessel.  
JPR 8080.5 P-1 Pyrotechnic Devices - 
Arming and Disarming 
Not Applicable iLIDS design does not have the capability to arm or 
disarm pyros. 
 
JPR 8080.5 P-2 Pyrotechnic Devices 
Preflight Verification Tests 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 P-3 Electrical Circuit Wire 
Splicing 
Not Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 P-4 Pyrotechnic Devices - 
Packaging Material 
Not Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 P-5 Pyrotechnic Devices - 
Identification 
Requirements 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 P-6 Protection of Electrical 
Circuitry for the NASA 
Standard Initiator 
Applicable   
JPR 8080.5 P-7 Pyrotechnic Devices Color 
Coding Requirements 
Not Applicable   
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Table C-2 - To Be Resolved/Determined/Specified (TBR/D/S) Items 
TBR/D/S ID Identity Title 
TBR-212 R.LIDS.0202 
R.LIDS.1113 
R.LIDS.1138 
On-orbit life for sun hours 
TBS-217 R.LIDS.1001 Berthing Concept of Operations 
TBS-218 R.LIDS.0183 Ionizing Radiation 
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Table C-3 - iLIDS Configuration Applicability 
The following table defines requirements that are unique to specific iLIDS configurations (i.e. -301, -302, etc.).  All other 
requirements are applicable to all configurations.  
 
Applicability iLIDS (-301) iLIDS (-302) 
R.LIDS.0001   
R.LIDS.0003   
R.LIDS.0004   
R.LIDS.0006   
R.LIDS.0008   
R.LIDS.0009   
R.LIDS.0010   
R.LIDS.0011   
R.LIDS.0012   
R.LIDS.0014   
R.LIDS.0017   
R.LIDS.0019   
R.LIDS.0020   
R.LIDS.0024   
R.LIDS.0024.1   
R.LIDS.0024.2   
R.LIDS.0026   
R.LIDS.0027   
R.LIDS.0029   
R.LIDS.0030   
R.LIDS.0034   
R.LIDS.0037   
R.LIDS.0038   
R.LIDS.0041 X  
R.LIDS.0043   
R.LIDS.0044   
R.LIDS.0046   
R.LIDS.0047   
R.LIDS.0050   
R.LIDS.0051   
R.LIDS.0052   
R.LIDS.0054   
R.LIDS.0055   
R.LIDS.0056   
R.LIDS.0057   
R.LIDS.0058   
R.LIDS.0060   
R.LIDS.0061   
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Applicability iLIDS (-301) iLIDS (-302) 
R.LIDS.0063 X  
R.LIDS.0064   
R.LIDS.0065 X  
R.LIDS.0066   
R.LIDS.0069 X  
R.LIDS.0071   
R.LIDS.0073   
R.LIDS.0075   
R.LIDS.0076   
R.LIDS.0079   
R.LIDS.0080 X  
R.LIDS.0082   
R.LIDS.0082.1   
R.LIDS.0091   
R.LIDS.0100   
R.LIDS.0101   
R.LIDS.0103   
R.LIDS.0104   
R.LIDS.0106   
R.LIDS.0107   
R.LIDS.0108   
R.LIDS.0109   
R.LIDS.0113   
R.LIDS.0116   
R.LIDS.0120   
R.LIDS.0124   
R.LIDS.0127   
R.LIDS.0128   
R.LIDS.0136   
R.LIDS.0137   
R.LIDS.0158   
R.LIDS.0159   
R.LIDS.0162   
R.LIDS.0183   
R.LIDS.0185   
R.LIDS.0186   
R.LIDS.0187   
R.LIDS.0188   
R.LIDS.0189   
R.LIDS.0190   
R.LIDS.0192   
R.LIDS.0197   
R.LIDS.0201  X 
R.LIDS.0202 X  
R.LIDS.0203   
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Applicability iLIDS (-301) iLIDS (-302) 
R.LIDS.0206   
R.LIDS.0207   
R.LIDS.0229   
R.LIDS.0256   
R.LIDS.0259   
R.LIDS.0286   
R.LIDS.0294   
R.LIDS.0295 X  
R.LIDS.0298   
R.LIDS.1001   
R.LIDS.1004   
R.LIDS.1005   
R.LIDS.1005.1   
R.LIDS.1006 X  
R.LIDS.1007  X 
R.LIDS.1037   
R.LIDS.1042 X  
R.LIDS.1051   
R.LIDS.1056  X 
R.LIDS.1060 X  
R.LIDS.1069   
R.LIDS.1074   
R.LIDS.1077   
R.LIDS.1083   
R.LIDS.1084   
R.LIDS.1088   
R.LIDS.1092   
R.LIDS.1093   
R.LIDS.1094   
R.LIDS.1095   
R.LIDS.1096   
R.LIDS.1097   
R.LIDS.1098   
R.LIDS.1099   
R.LIDS.1100   
R.LIDS.1101   
R.LIDS.1102   
R.LIDS.1103 X  
R.LIDS.1104   
R.LIDS.1105   
R.LIDS.1106   
R.LIDS.1107   
R.LIDS.1108.1   
R.LIDS.1108.2   
R.LIDS.1108.3   
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Applicability iLIDS (-301) iLIDS (-302) 
R.LIDS.1108.4   
R.LIDS.1109   
R.LIDS.1111  X 
R.LIDS.1112   
R.LIDS.1113   
R.LIDS.1114   
R.LIDS.1115 X  
R.LIDS.1116   
R.LIDS.1117   
R.LIDS.1118   
R.LIDS.1119   
R.LIDS.1120   
R.LIDS.1121   
R.LIDS.1124   
R.LIDS.1125   
R.LIDS.1126   
R.LIDS.1129   
R.LIDS.1130   
R.LIDS.1131   
R.LIDS.1132   
R.LIDS.1133   
R.LIDS.1134   
R.LIDS.1137   
R.LIDS.1138 X  
R.LIDS.1139  X 
R.LIDS.1140   
R.LIDS.1141   
R.LIDS.1142   
R.LIDS.5003   
R.LIDS.5007   
R.LIDS.5008   
R.LIDS.5009   
R.LIDS.5010   
R.LIDS.5011   
R.LIDS.5012   
R.LIDS.5013   
R.LIDS.5014   
R.LIDS.5021   
R.LIDS.5022   
R.LIDS.5033   
R.LIDS.5034   
R.LIDS.5036 X  
R.LIDS.5037   
R.LIDS.5038 X  
R.LIDS.5050   
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Applicability iLIDS (-301) iLIDS (-302) 
R.LIDS.5057   
R.LIDS.5061   
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Table C-4 - iLIDS PTRS/IDD Associative Requirements 
 
Identity Title 
R.LIDS.0001 iLIDS Structural Attachment on Host Vehicle 
R.LIDS.0003 Host Electrical Power Interface - 120 Vdc 
R.LIDS.0004 Reception of Commands for Docking 
R.LIDS.0014 iLIDS Health and Status During iLIDS Operations 
R.LIDS.0024 Transfer of Data and Communications 
R.LIDS.0024.1 Ethernet Cable Specification 
R.LIDS.0024.2 MIL-STD-1553 Cable Specification 
R.LIDS.0027 iLIDS Thermal and Induced Environments 
R.LIDS.0029 Structural/Mechanical Attachment 
R.LIDS.0030 Transfer of Power 
R.LIDS.0041 Leak Rates for iLIDS Feed-Throughs When Mated (Excluding -302) 
R.LIDS.0063 Docking Envelope (Excluding -302) 
R.LIDS.0080 iLIDS (-301) Mass 
R.LIDS.0082 iLIDS Pass-Through Diameter, Petals Removed 
R.LIDS.0082.1 iLIDS Pass-Through Diameter, With Petals 
R.LIDS.0124 Structural Design and Verification Requirements 
R.LIDS.1005 HCS Guide Pins 
R.LIDS.1005.1 HCS Guide Pin Receptacles 
R.LIDS.1006 Seal on Seal Mating Interface (Excluding -302) 
R.LIDS.1007 Seal on Metal Mating Interface (-302) 
R.LIDS.1051 Active Thermal System Control 
R.LIDS.1056 iLIDS (-302) Mass 
R.LIDS.1069 Separation System - Demate 
R.LIDS.1103 Pyrotechnic Operated Devices (Excluding -302) 
R.LIDS.1111 iLIDS (-302) MMOD 
R.LIDS.1113 Leak Rate for iLIDS-to-iLIDS Interface 
R.LIDS.1114 Leak Rate for iLIDS-to-Vehicle Interface 
R.LIDS.1115 Pyrotechnic Release (Excluding -302) 
R.LIDS.1124 iLIDS Active Hook Profile 
R.LIDS.1125 iLIDS Passive Hook Profile 
R.LIDS.1141 Heater Operation - Blind Mode 
R.LIDS.1142 IDSS IDD Compatibility 
R.LIDS.5003 iLIDS Volume and Keep Out Zones 
R.LIDS.5007 iLIDS Mating Interface Allowable Thermal Differential 
R.LIDS.5008 iLIDS Capture Ring in Passive Mode 
R.LIDS.5009 iLIDS Capture Ring in Active Mode 
R.LIDS.5010 SCS Guide Petal System 
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Identity Title 
R.LIDS.5011 SCS Guide Petal System Detail 
R.LIDS.5012 SCS Ring Dimensions 
R.LIDS.5013 SCS Magnet and Striker 
R.LIDS.5014 Pre-Capture SCS Compressive Force Resistance 
R.LIDS.5021 Umbilical Separation - Passive 
R.LIDS.5022 FRAM-Type Connector Pinouts 
R.LIDS.5033 Command and Data Handling Interface, Physical Layer Safe Operation Area 
R.LIDS.5034 Heater Power and Control 
R.LIDS.5036 iLIDS-to-Host Vehicle Electrical Interface (Excluding -302) 
R.LIDS.5037 Host Interface Connector Pinouts 
R.LIDS.5038 iLIDS Box Connections-to-Host Vehicle Electrical Interface (Excluding -302) 
R.LIDS.5050 iLIDS-to-iLIDS Thermal Contact Conductance 
R.LIDS.5057 iLIDS-to-Host Vehicle Thermal Contact Conductance 
R.LIDS.5061 Maximum Temperature Differential for SCS Mating Interfaces 
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Table C-5 - iLIDS Requirements Revision From/To Comparison 
The "From/To" table contains red colored text for omissions, blue for new or replaced text, and black for no changes.  
Strike-through text means the requirement is deleted.  The table reflects only items that have been modified between 
revisions.  The column definitions are as follows: 
1 Status 
• Accepted: Previously accepted in earlier revision 
• To Be Deleted: Deleted from revision 
• Candidate: New requirement from revision 
2 Change 
• IDD Reference Change: Requirement text/rationale changed to reference the IDD in lieu of a specific value. 
• Major: Context change of requirement for reference or new inputs. 
• Major – Deleted: Accepted requirements from Rev E that have been deleted in Rev F. 
• Minor: Editorial changes made that do not impact the context of the requirement. Changes include the addition or deletion of 
rationale text to further convey meaning. 
• Minor – Status Change: Requirements status changed from Candidate in Rev E to Accepted in Rev F with no other changes 
impacting the context of the requirement. 
• New: New (Candidate) requirement added to current revision. 
 
Identity Status1 Name Requirement Rationale Change2 
R.LIDS.0003 ACCEPTED Host Electrical Power 
Interface - 120 Vdc 
The iLIDS (-301, -302) shall operate with host 
vehicle power of 120 Vdc in accordance with 
JSC-64599, iLIDS Electric Power Quality 
Description Document. 
An electrical power interface is needed to allow the host 
vehicle to power the iLIDS.  This is the power for iLIDS 
consumption, which is not to be confused with the host 
vehicle pass-through power to the mating vehicle.  
Future configurations will allow for other host vehicle 
power (e.g..,
Minor 
 28 Vdc). 
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Identity Status1 Name Requirement Rationale Change2 
R.LIDS.0006 CANDIDATE Docking Termination The iLIDS shall terminate docking upon 
receipt of a command from the host vehicle 
prior to hook activation. 
New For safety purposes, automated functions such as 
docking should be designed with an override capability 
that allows the host vehicle to stop, safe, or assume 
manual control of the automated function after it was 
initiated.  The point at which the override occurs will 
differ depending on the function.  Some activities may 
only be taken to a safe state and no manual control is 
available.  The intent is to cover the time span beginning 
with SCS mechanism release contact and extending 
through rigidization docking completion.  This ability is 
required for the Vehicle crew, ISS crew, or other Space 
System operators to control automated functions 
onboard the Vehicle.  It covers the case where the 
vehicle is unable to achieve capture, wants to back out, 
reset, and make a second docking attempt.  It also 
covers the case where the crew simply becomes 
uncomfortable with the safety of proceeding onward with 
the docking operation, and wishes to halt it and back 
away. 
R.LIDS.0008 ACCEPTED Pause Docking 
Commands 
The iLIDS shall accept a command from the 
host vehicle to pause the docking sequence 
during any part ofat predetermined safe points 
in the operationsequence
There are failure scenarios where the docking sequence 
should not be terminated, but rather paused to allow 
troubleshooting. 
. 
Major 
R.LIDS.0009 ACCEPTED Pause Undocking 
Commands 
The iLIDS shall accept a command from the 
host vehicle to pause the undocking sequence 
during any part ofat predetermined safe points 
in the operationsequence
There are failure scenarios where the undocking 
sequence should not be terminated, but rather paused 
to allow troubleshooting. 
. 
Major 
R.LIDS.0024.1 ACCEPTED Ethernet Cable 
Specification 
The iLIDS umbilical cabling for 100 BASE-TX 
network segments shall be constructed using 
shielded twisted pair Category 5e components 
in accordance with ANSI/TIA/EIA 
568C568B
Ethernet cables for flight hardware is to be constructed 
using approved standards. 
.2, Annex N, Commercial Building 
Telecommunications Cabling Standard, Part 
2: Balanced Twisted-Pair Cabling 
Components of maximum physical cable 
length not to exceed 4 feet. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.0041 ACCEPTED Leak Rates for iLIDS 
Feed-Throughs When 
Mated 
(excludingExcluding
The iLIDS (excluding -302) feed-throughs 
internal to iLIDS shall have a maximum of 
0.0007 lbm dry air/day (0.0003 kg air/day) 
leakage at vestibule pressurization of 14.7 
psia (101 kPa) and an external vacuum 
pressure when mated. 
 -
302) 
The leakage value is based on 14 Class 77H hermetic 
feed-throughs (8X4X size 25 connectors, 6X10X
Minor 
 size 13 
connectors).  See also R.LIDS.1113 and R.LIDS.1114. 
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Identity Status1 Name Requirement Rationale Change2 
R.LIDS.0046 ACCEPTED EVA Sharp Edges Any iLIDS hardware accessible to the EVA 
crew within 24" of an adjacent EVA worksite, 
excluding the defined iLIDS EVA Keep-out-
zone, shall meet the edge, corner, and 
protrusion requirements in Table 3.-1, Figure 
3-1, and Table 3-2 of JSC-28918, EVA Design 
Requirements and Considerations. 
These edge, corner, and protrusion requirements were 
originally developed to prevent the cutting of the EMU 
glove.  This requirement is in accordance with JSC-
28918, EVA Design Requirements and Considerations, 
Section 3.11. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.0047 ACCEPTED EVA Thin Material 
Edge Radii
The iLIDS materials less than 0.08-in. (2.032-
mm) thick that are used in a location 
accessible to EVA, edge radii shall be greater 
than 0.003-in. (0.0762-mm).
Materials 
These edge and corner requirements were originally 
developed to prevent the cutting of the 
(0.0762-mm), and 
exposed edges shall be uniformly spaced, not 
to exceed 0.5-in. (1.27-cm) gaps, flush at the 
exposed surface plane and shielded from 
direct EVA interaction. 
Extravehicular 
Mobility Unit (
Major 
EMU) glove.  This requirement is in 
accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design Requirements 
and Considerations, Section 3.11.2 and modified to 
represent the correct conversion factor. 
R.LIDS.0048 ACCEPTED EVA Thin Material 
Spacing To Be 
Deleted 
iLIDS materials less than 0.08-in. (2.032-mm) 
thick that are used in a location accessible to 
EVA, shall have edges uniformly spaced, not 
to exceed 0.5-in. (1.27-cm) gaps, flush at the 
exposed surface plane and shielded from 
direct EVA interaction. 
These edge and corner requirements were originally 
developed to prevent cutting of the EMU glove.  This 
requirement is in accordance with JSC-28918, EVA 
Design Requirements and Considerations, Section 
3.11.2. 
Major - 
Deleted 
R.LIDS.0055 ACCEPTED Pinch Points The iLIDS shall ensure that hardware located 
within translation paths and established 
worksites (planned and contingency) that is 
EVA-accessible does not have pinch hazards. 
This applies to, but is not limited to, hardware that 
pivots, retracts, flexes, or has a configuration such that a 
gap of greater than 0.5 in. (12.7 mm), but less than 1.4 
in. (3.556 cm) (glove pinching), exists between the 
equipment and adjacent structure.  Any item that has a 
potential to pinch any appendage, including legs or other 
body parts, will also be designed out or protected 
against, either by using a keep out zone (KOZ) for areas 
outside a translation path or worksite or by using a 
physical barrier.  This requirement is in accordance with 
JSC-28918, EVA Design Requirements and 
Considerations, Section 3.18. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.0063 ACCEPTED Docking Envelope 
(excludingExcluding
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall be capable of 
docking when the vehicle misalignments and 
relative motions are within the parameters as 
specified by JSC-65795, NDS IDD, table NDS 
Initial Contact Conditions "Design To" Limits. 
 -
302) 
Table NDS Initial Contact Conditions "Design To" Limits 
includes high-level information on capture envelope 
data. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.0065 ACCEPTED Soft Capture 
(excludingExcluding
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall perform soft 
capture during docking operations.  -
302) 
Soft capture is the initial physical connection prior to 
final structural mating. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.0069 ACCEPTED Attenuation 
(excludingExcluding
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall attenuate 
relative motion between the two mating 
vehicles, subject to the mass properties, load 
constraints, and contact conditions specified 
in JSC-65970, iLIDS Thermal and Induced 
Environments (iLIDS TIES), during docking 
operations. 
 -
302) 
JSC-65970, iLIDS Thermal and Induced Environments 
(iLIDS TIES), includes load attenuations and mass 
properties, among other properties. 
Minor 
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R.LIDS.0075 ACCEPTED Undocking Time The iLIDS shall be capable of undocking 
within 10 minutes when iLIDS undocking 
sequence is initiated. 
The requirement implies that all nominal systems are 
required to be operational within this time, including 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C)GN&C
Minor 
 
parameters.  The undocking sequence begins with the 
hatch secured and the crew's initiation of the iLIDS 
undocking sequence. 
R.LIDS.0082.1 CANDIDATE iLIDS Pass-Through 
Diameter, With Petals ACCEPTED 
With SCS guide petals installed, the iLIDS 
shall provide the unobstructed minimum 
diameter passage for pressurized transfer of 
crew and cargo with no permanent 
protrusions, drag-through cables, or 
obstruction, excluding the inter-module 
ventilation air duct as specified in JSC-65795, 
NDS IDD, figure NDS Docking Interface. 
With the petals installed it is still a requirement to 
provide a clear passage for unsuited crew, cargo, etc.  
Value is based on study by ISS for cargo transfer. 
Minor - 
Status 
Change 
R.LIDS.0100 ACCEPTED Electromagnetic 
Interference/Electrom
agnetic Compatibility 
(EMI/EMC) 
The iLIDS shall be designed to meet 
requirements in JSC-65842, iLIDS 
Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) 
Description Document. 
This requirement adheres to approved standards. Minor 
R.LIDS.0116 ACCEPTED Flight Hardware Materials and processes for flight hardware 
shall meet the requirements of NASA-STD-
6016, Standard Material & Process 
Requirements for Spacecraft.
The NASA standard covers generic Materials and 
Process requirements. The iLIDS will utilize JSC-27301, 
Materials Control Plan for JSC Flight Hardware as a 
specific implementation to meet NASA-STD-6016.  JSC-
27301 also covers workmanship standards for 
mechanical and electrical hardware and implements 
SSP 30233, Space Station Requirements for Materials 
and Processes. 
 as implemented 
by JSC-27301, Materials Control Plan for JSC 
Flight Hardware. 
Major 
R.LIDS.0124 ACCEPTED Structural Design and 
Verification 
Requirements 
The iLIDS shall be designed and verified to 
meet the requirements of SSP 30559 
Structural Design and Verification 
Requirements.  Exception:  SSP 30559, 
Section 3.1.9.3 (Dewars) and 3.1.9.7 (Burst 
Discs) are not applicable. 
This requirement adheres to approved standards.  For 
launch and unmated cases, the shuttle factors of safety 
will be used. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.0136 ACCEPTED General Identification 
Marking 
Requirements 
The iLIDS shall use nameplates and product 
marking in accordance with MIL-STD-130, 
IdentificationPRC-9002, Process Specification 
for Part
This is in accordance with approved standards. 
 Marking of U.S. Military Property. 
Major 
R.LIDS.0159 ACCEPTED Range of Motion Aspects of the iLIDS with which unsuited 
Intravehicular Activity (IVA) crewmembers 
physically interact during planned tasks shall 
be within the ranges of motion provided in 
SSP 50005, International Space Station Flight 
Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-
3000/T), Figure 3.3.2.3.1-1. 
This requirement is in accordance with SSP 50005, 
International Space Station Flight Crew Integration 
Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Section 3.3. 
Minor 
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R.LIDS.0183 ACCEPTED Ionizing Radiation The iLIDS shall meet specified performance 
requirements when exposed to the radiation 
dose environment in accordance with JSC-
64598, iLIDS Ionizing Radiation Control Plan.
The iLIDS must meet ionizing radiation requirements.  
This document establishes the ionizing radiation design 
susceptibility environment for low earth orbit and lunar 
environments.  
Exception:  The iLIDS (-301 & -302) shall 
meet radiation hardness levels for Single 
Event Upsets (SEUs), Single Event Latch-up 
(SEL), Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR), 
and Single Event Burn-Out (SEB) to a 
minimum True Linear Energy Transfer (LET) = 
TBS-218. 
Major 
R.LIDS.0189 ACCEPTED IVA Touch 
Temperature 
iLIDS surfaces, which are subject to IVA 
crewmember contact, shall meet the touch 
temperature requirements as specified in SSP 
50021, Safety Requirements Document, 
Section. 3.3.6.12.1, Internal Volume Touch 
Temperature.
iLIDS internal surface temperatures must be maintained 
within the touch temperature limits to prevent 
crewmember injury from continuous and momentary 
contact. 
 Exception: IVA touch 
temperature limits may not be met for some 
time after the two vehicles have completed 
docking until the warm-up period is complete.  
The warm-up period will be characterized in 
JSC 65795, NDS IDD. 
Major 
R.LIDS.0202 TBD iLIDS On-Orbit 
Design Life without 
Maintenance - Short 
Duration 
(excludingExcluding
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall be designed 
to meet a minimum of 231 days of low earth 
orbit design life with no maintenance. 
 -
302) 
The 231 days are as follows: a. Unmated operations on-
orbit: 21 days - Ultraviolet exposure not to exceed 214 
equivalent sun hours (TBR-212) b. Mated mission 
duration: 210 days 
Minor 
R.LIDS.0206 ACCEPTED iLIDS Passive Mode 
Docking/Undocking 
Cycles 
The iLIDS shall be capable of a minimum of 
70 passive mode docking/undocking 
operations. 
This includes 20 ground operations and 50 flight cycles.  
Fifty cycles is calculated by a 15-year life with 3 
missions per year and a margin of 5.  The cycles are 
defined as a full docking/undocking sequence.  The 70 
Passive mode docking/undocking cycle operations does 
not account for component-level cycles (i.e., flex-drive, 
actuators, etc.).  Guide Petal removal and installation is 
a function of the nominal cycling of the 
docking/undocking operation. 
Minor 
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R.LIDS.0295 ACCEPTED iLIDS MMOD - Short 
Duration 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall provide a 
Probability of No Penetration (PNP) of 
0.999983 or greater during 210 days docked 
with the ISS when exposed to the 
Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris 
(MMOD)MMOD
The system will be exposed to a variety of natural and 
induced environments that may pose a threat to 
functionality and performance, and therefore must be 
taken into account in the design.  The PNP is based on 
the exposed surface area of the iLIDS with 210 days of 
exposure while docked at the ISS.  The surface area 
assumes standoff shielding on the iLIDS outer diameter.  
Penetration is defined as a through-hole in the pressure 
shell or detached spall from the inside surface of the 
pressure shell such that hazardous debris is generated 
within the pressurized volume.  This requirement does 
not account for failures resulting from MMOD strikes on 
other components or during unmated operations.  These 
failure probabilities will be presented as technical risks 
and accounted for in hazard reports.  The -302 has a 
longer life and therefore a different PNP number. 
 environments as defined in 
NASA/TP-2002-210780 for orbital debris and 
SSP 30425, Space Station Program Natural 
Environment Definition for Design for 
meteoroids. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.1001 CANDIDATE Berthing The iLIDS shall support berthing per To Be 
Specified (TBS)-217. 
New The iLIDS provides for vehicle-level docking.  The iLIDS 
design shall not preclude berthing.  Refer to Berthing 
Requirements Document TBS-217 for specific berthing 
requirements. 
R.LIDS.1005.1 ACCEPTED HCS Guide Pin 
Receptacles 
The iLIDS shall provide guide pin receptacles 
for tangential constraint and alignment of the 
systems during hard mate per JSC-65795, 
NDS IDD, figure HCS Guide Pin Hole Detail 
and figure HCS Docking Interface. 
Guide pin/receptacles provide fine alignment during soft 
capture systemSCS
Minor 
 retraction and restrict rotation and 
shear of the systems while mated.  See also 
R.LIDS.0029 for the figure depicting guide pin 
receptacle location. 
R.LIDS.1006 ACCEPTED Seal on Seal Mating 
Interface 
(excludingExcluding
The iLIDS (excluding -302) HCS seal on seal 
mating plane shall meet the details as 
specified in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS 
(excluding -302) HCS Mating Plane Seal and 
Electrical Bonding Details. 
 -
302) 
The docking system must include a seal interface to 
support pressurization after structural mate.  The seals 
meet the emerging IDSS and support either seal on seal 
or seal on metal operation.  The corresponding figure in 
JSC-65795, NDS IDD, provides interface definition for 
the HCS Mating Plane. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.1042 ACCEPTED Pyrotechnic Initiation 
(excludingExcluding
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall use NASA 
Standard Initiators (NSIs) for pyrotechnic 
devices. 
 -
302) 
Pyrotechnic provides additional fault tolerance for 
undocking hazards.  iLIDS pyrotechnics are safety-
critical because their inadvertent operation results in a 
catastrophic hazard.  Use of proven NSI design ensures 
safe and reliable pyrotechnic design and operation.  This 
requirement is in accordance with SSP 50021, Safety 
Requirements Document, Section 3.3.6.5.1.1.  The -302 
is intended for use on ISS and has been decided to not 
include pyros so that the port cannot be fouled by firing 
pyros and disabling hooks for future docking. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.1060 ACCEPTED iLIDS Active Mode 
Docking/Undocking 
Cycles 
(excludingExcluding
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall be capable of 
a minimum of 24 active mode 
docking/undocking operations. 
 -
302) 
This includes 20 ground operation cycles and 4 flight 
cycles.  The cycles are defined as a full 
docking/undocking sequence.  The 24 active mode 
docking/undocking cycle operations does not account 
for component-level cycles (i.e., flex-drive, actuators, 
etc.). 
Minor 
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R.LIDS.1097 ACCEPTED iLIDS Passive Dock 
Mode 
The iLIDS shall provide a Passive Dock mode 
of operations. 
During the Passive Dock mode, the iLIDS will provide all 
health and statusH&S
Minor 
 data as well as flags for soft 
capture.  In addition, all outputs will be inhibited during 
operation (e.g., motors, magnets, etc.). 
R.LIDS.1098 ACCEPTED iLIDS Passive Undock 
Mode 
The iLIDS shall provide a Passive Undock 
mode of operations which inhibits all outputs, 
while providing H&S data and flags. 
During the Passive Undock mode, the iLIDS will provide 
all health and statusH&S
Minor 
 data as well as flags for 
undocking completion.  In addition, all outputs will be 
inhibited during operation (e.g., motors, magnets, etc.). 
R.LIDS.1099 ACCEPTED iLIDS Safe Mode The iLIDS shall provide a Safe mode of 
operations which inhibits all outputs, while 
providing H&S data. 
During the Safe mode, the iLIDS will provide all health 
and statusH&S
Minor 
 data.  In addition, all outputs will be 
inhibited during operation (e.g., motors, magnets, etc.). 
R.LIDS.1102 ACCEPTED Design For Minimum 
Risk 
iLIDS hazards related to Design For Minimum 
Risk (DFMR) areas of design shall be 
controlled by the safety-related properties and 
characteristics of the design.  The failure 
tolerance criteria are only to be applied to 
these designs as necessary to ensure that 
credible failures that may affect the design do 
not invalidate the safety-related properties of 
the design. 
This requirement is in accordance with SSP 41000, 
System Specification for the International Space Station, 
Section 3.3.6.1.2.  DFMR are areas where hazards are 
controlled by specification requirements that specify 
safety-related properties and characteristics of the 
design that have been baselined by the ISS program 
requirements rather than failure tolerance criteria.  The 
failure tolerance criteria of R.LIDS.0106 will only be 
applied to these designs as necessary to ensure that 
credible failures that may affect the design do not 
invalidate the safety-related properties of the design.  
For example, a pressure vessel shall be certified safe 
based upon its inherent properties to withstand pressure 
loading that have been verified by analysis and 
qualification and acceptance testing; however, failure 
tolerance must be imposed upon external systems that 
might affect the vessel, such as a tank heater, to ensure 
that failures of the heater do not cause the pressure to 
exceed the Maximum Design Pressure (MDP) of the 
pressure vessel.  Examples are mechanisms, structures, 
glass, pressure vessels, pressurized lines and fittings, 
functional pyrotechnic devices, material compatibility, 
flammability, etc. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.1103 ACCEPTED Pyrotechnic Operated 
Devices 
(excludingExcluding
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall provide 
pyrotechnic devices designed and tested to 
the requirements of JSC- 62809, Human 
Rated Spacecraft Pyrotechnic Specification.
 -
302) 
iLIDS pyrotechnic devices must meet pyrotechnic 
requirements to ensure safe pyrotechnic design and 
operation.  This requirement is in accordance with SSP 
50021, Safety Requirements Document, Section 
3.3.6.5.1.3. 
 
Exception: Exception is taken to JSC 62809 
Sections 3.1, 3.2.2, 3.6.18, 3.6.19, 3.6.20, 
3.6.24.1, 3.6.24.2, 3.6.24.3, 3.6.26.1, 4.1.3, 
4.4.9, 4.5.1.6, 4.5.2.4, 4.5.2.5, 7.3.3, 7.3.4, 
8.1, 8.2, 8.2.4, 8.3 to 8.3.6, 8.4.7, 8.5.1, and 
8.5.2.  Sections noted are not verifiable by the 
iLIDS project. 
Major 
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R.LIDS.1104 ACCEPTED Crew Protection for 
Electrical Shock 
The iLIDS shall provide protection for the crew 
from electrical hazards in accordance with 
SSP 50005, International Space Station Flight 
Crew Integration Standard (NASA-STD-
3000/T), Section 6.4.3. 
The crew must be protected from potentially 
catastrophic electrical shock from the iLIDS electrical 
systems.  This requirement is in accordance with SSP 
50021, Safety Requirements Document, Section 
3.3.6.8.2. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.1108 ACCEPTED Fastener Selection 
To Be 
Deleted 
The iLIDS fasteners used on removable 
structures and components shall be selected 
and designed in accordance with SSP 50005, 
International Space Station Flight Crew 
Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), 
Sections 11.9.3 and 14.6.3.3. 
This requirement adheres to approved standards. Major - 
Deleted 
R.LIDS.1108.1 CANDIDATE Fastener - Threaded 
Ends ACCEPTED 
The iLIDS threaded ends of IVA and EVA 
screws and bolts extending more than 0.12 in. 
shall be capped to protect against sharp 
threads. 
This is to protect the crew from injury due to sharp 
edges in accordance with SSP 50005, International 
Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA-
STD-3000/T), Section 6.3.3.6. 
Minor - 
Status 
Change 
R.LIDS.1108.2 CANDIDATE Fastener - 
Maintenance Force ACCEPTED 
iLIDS on-orbit maintainable IVA fasteners 
shall require no greater than 20 lbf for 
engagement or disengagement with ratchet-
type tools. 
The value accommodates the strength limitations of the 
5th percentile male population, as stated by SSP 41000, 
System Specification for the International Space Station, 
Section 3.3.7.3.2, Table XXXIII, which is derived from 
SSP 50005, International Space Station Flight Crew 
Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Section 
4.9.3.B. 
Minor - 
Status 
Change 
R.LIDS.1108.3 CANDIDATE Fastener - 
Maintenance Torque ACCEPTED 
iLIDS on-orbit maintainable IVA fasteners 
shall require no greater than 11 ft-lb torque for 
engagement or disengagement with driver 
type tools. 
The value accommodates the strength limitations of the 
5th percentile male population as stated by SSP 41000, 
System Specification for the International Space Station, 
Section 3.3.7.3.2, Table XXXIII, which is derived from 
SSP 50005, International Space Station Flight Crew 
Integration Standard (NASA-STD-3000/T), Section 
4.9.3.B. 
Minor - 
Status 
Change 
R.LIDS.1108.4 CANDIDATE IVA Toolbox 
Compatibility 
iLIDS mounting fasteners used on guide 
petals and electrical boxes shall be selected 
to be compatible with IVA tool box assembly 
part number SEG33113668-301. 
New This requirement adheres to approved standards to 
support on-orbit maintenance.  The standard tool list is 
comprised of tools to be used for Orbital Replacement 
Unit (ORU) removal and replacement.  The IVA tool box 
is in accordance with JSC 28533, ISS Catalogue of IVA 
GFE FCE. 
R.LIDS.1109 ACCEPTED JPR 8080.5 - JSC 
Design and 
Procedural Standards 
The iLIDS shall meet JPR 8080.5, JSC 
Design and Procedural Standards, 
requirements marked applicable, as specified 
herein in Appendix C. 
Adherence to NASA standards.  JPR 8080.5, JSC 
Design and Procedural Standards provides design and 
procedural requirements for any human spaceflight 
program, project, spacecraft, system, or end item. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.1112 ACCEPTED Umbilical Auto-Mate The iLIDS shall automatically mate umbilical 
connectors within 15 minutes of achieving 
hard mate. 
Umbilical connector mate is critical function for resource 
transfer. It is necessary to perform this action without 
EVA/IVA.
Minor 
Extravehicular Activity/Intravehicular Activity 
(EVA/IVA). 
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R.LIDS.1113 TBD Leak Rate for iLIDS-
to-iLIDS Interface 
The iLIDS-to-iLIDS interface shall have a 
maximum of 0.0025 lbm dry air/day (0.0011 
kg air/day) leakage at vestibule pressurization 
of 14.7 psia (101 kPa) and an external 
vacuum pressure when mated. 
The leakage value assumes 12 hard capture 
systemHCS hooks fully engaged and derives from a 
nominal ISS trajectory and exposure to 1E21 atoms/cm2 
atomic oxygen and 214 equivalent sun hours (To Be 
Resolved (TBR-)-
Minor 
212) ultraviolet radiation (for a duration 
of up to 21 days).  The atomic oxygen exposure includes 
both pre-treatment of the seals and on-orbit exposure at 
4.4 x 10E19 oxygen atoms/cm2 per day.  See also 
R.LIDS.0041 and R.LIDS.1114. 
R.LIDS.1115 TBD Pyrotechnic Release 
(excluding
ACCEPT
ED Excluding
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall provide 
pyrotechnics in both the active and passive 
hooks at the hard mate interface 
 -
302) capable of 
releasing all 24a single gang of 6
If the iLIDS active hooks fail to unlatch, the host vehicle 
may fire the pyrotechnics releasing all 24 hooks 
 hooks within 
150 ms (TBR-40) ms, allowing the host 
vehicle to separate from the mated vehicle. 
pyrotechnic(s) to release the gang(s) of hooks 
containing the failed hooks allowing the host to separate 
from the mated vehicle
Minor - 
Status 
Change 
.  The iLIDS active and passive 
hooks are distributed across 4 gangs of 6 hooks each (2 
active hook gangs and 2 passive hook gangs) for a total 
of 24 hooks (12 active and 12 passive). 
R.LIDS.1116 ACCEPTED H&S Data Processing 
Latency 
The iLIDS shall have a healthHealth and 
statusStatus (H&S)
An upper bound on H&S data processing latency must 
be established to drive and manage overall avionics and 
software system design and end-to-end avionics and 
software performance.  This value is driven by and is the 
part of the time allocation, allocated to iLIDS, from the 
max total time (200 ms from NDS IDD) required for a 
switch from system A to B to take place in the case of a 
fault requiring primary control being transferred from 
system A to B.  If a fault requiring a switch to the 
redundant string is identified, there is a minimum 
amount of time to detect, report to the vehicle, and the 
vehicle to issue a command to switch between 
controllers in order to maintain safe control of the linear 
actuators, depending on the mode and state of iLIDS.  
This switch time is most critical during dock mode 
capture and attenuation states.  See also R.LIDS.0012 
and R.LIDS.1137. 
 data processing latency 
no greater than 45 ms, where the 
performance measurement is taken from the 
time Health and Status (H&S) data is sampled 
to the time conditioned H&S data crosses the 
iLIDS to host vehicle interface. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.1117 ACCEPTED Fastener Integrity iLIDS fasteners shall be in accordance with 
JPR 8730.2, JSC Fastener Integrity Testing 
Program. 
The iLIDS contains numerous safety-critical fasteners 
whose properties are crucial to the safe operation of the 
iLIDS.  Counterfeit or substandard fasteners could 
cause a structural failure of the iLIDS and result in a 
catastrophic hazard. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.1121 ACCEPTED EMU TMG 
Orthofabric and Glove 
Back External Touch-
Temperature 
Compliance 
The iLIDS hardware that interfaces with the 
EMU Thermal/Micrometeoroid Garment 
(TMG) orthofabric, which includes the 
backside of the EMU glove, shall be in 
accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design 
Requirements and Considerations, Section 
4.4.5. 
The iLIDS will provide input into the integrated thermal 
analysis.  These limits do not apply to the palm of the 
glove that has different standards set out in Section 
4.4.4.  See R.LIDS.0060. 
Minor 
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R.LIDS.1122 ACCEPTED EMU TMG 
Orthofabric and Glove 
Back External Touch-
Incidental Contact 
To Be 
Deleted 
iLIDS EVA surfaces that can be touched shall 
be within a range of -244 °F to 320 °F (-153 
°C to 160 °C). 
This is to demonstrate compliance with EMU TMG 
orthofabric limitations for external portions of hardware 
that can be inadvertently touched by brushing or 
bumping in EVA operations.  This requirement is in 
accordance with JSC-28918, EVA Design Requirements 
and Considerations, Section 4.4.5.1. 
Major - 
Deleted 
R.LIDS.1123 ACCEPTED EMU TMG 
Orthofabric and Glove 
Back External Touch-
Extended Contact 
To Be 
Deleted 
The iLIDS shall design EVA hardware 
surfaces requiring prolonged compression of 
the EMU TMG orthofabric to remain within a  
In rare cases, EVA operations and/or hardware design 
require long-duration compression of the TMG 
orthofabric, thereby thermally shorting the multilayer 
insulation and making TMG layers vulnerable to thermal 
damage.  This requirement is in accordance with JSC-
28918, EVA Design Requirements and Considerations, 
Section 4.4.5.2. 
Major - 
Deleted 
R.LIDS.1127 ACCEPTED IVA Connectors 
To Be 
Deleted 
The iLIDS connectors shall allow for IVA 
mate/demate operations in support of 
contingency maintenance operations in orbit. 
The iLIDS assembly does not count for nominal 
maintenance in flight.  However, iLIDS connectors on 
the electrical boxes are designed to be mated/demated 
by an IVA operator if a contingency Orbital Replacement 
Unit (ORU) replacement is required. 
Major - 
Deleted 
R.LIDS.1133 ACCEPTED Data Exchange with 
the Host Vehicle (EIA-
422-B) 
The iLIDS shall exchange data with the host 
vehicle in an asynchronous serial 
communications format utilizing a Universal 
Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) 
controller, NRZ (Non-Return to Zero (NRZ) 
with one start bit, 8 data bits (Least Significant 
Bit (
This is the iLIDS specific implementation of EIA-422-B. 
LSB) first) and one stop bit. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.1137 CANDIDATE Fault Response 
Performance ACCEPTED 
The iLIDS shall be capable of detecting any 
internal fault, notifying the host vehicle of the 
fault via the H&S data, and executing a fault 
response command from the host vehicle 
within 200 ms, including 120 ms of 
communication and processing time within the 
host vehicle. 
The iLIDS must be capable of detecting and responding 
to faults quickly during docking attempts to ensure 
adequate dynamic performance in the event that system 
B is needed to complete a docking attempt or in the 
event a docking attempt abort is needed.  iLIDS 
dynamics simulations will use this 200 ms time as the 
idle time between system A and system B operations 
and between system B operations and the beginning of 
a docking attempt abort.  The requirement is based on 
the two associative requirements (R.LIDS.0012 and 
R.LIDS.1116). The iLIDS will send signals in 35 ms and 
receive in 45 ms. 
Minor - 
Status 
Change 
R.LIDS.1138 TBD Solar Ultraviolet 
Radiation 
(excludingExcluding
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall meet all of its 
functional and performance requirements 
during and after expose -
302) 
exposure to the solar 
ultraviolet radiation (UV) environment as 
defined in SSP 30425, Space Station Program 
Natural Environment Definition for Design, 
Section 7.2 with the limit to not to exceed 214 
equivalent sun hoursEquivalent Sun Hours 
(ESH)
The iLIDS must operate in the solar ultraviolet radiation 
environment.  The limits are based on restrictions for the 
iLIDS seal exposure to Equivalent Sun Hours (ESH) and 
UV. 
 (TBR-212) ultraviolet radiation (for a 
duration of up to 21 days). 
Minor 
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R.LIDS.1139 CANDIDATE Solar Ultraviolet 
Radiation (-302) ACCEPTED 
The iLIDS (-302) shall meet all of its functional 
and performance requirements during and 
after exposeexposure
The iLIDS must operate in the solar ultraviolet radiation 
environment. 
 to the solar ultraviolet 
radiation environment as defined in SSP 
30425, Space Station Program Natural 
Environment Definition for Design, Section 
7.2. 
Minor - 
Status 
Change 
R.LIDS.1140 CANDIDATE Vacuum Environment 
ACCEPTED 
The iLIDS shall be fully functional while 
exposed to the ambient pressure of 1.0E-11 
Pascal. 
Value is derived from the natural environment definition 
given in SSP 30425, Space Station Program Natural 
Environment Definition for Design.  This is the vacuum 
environment for geosynchronous environment. 
Minor - 
Status 
Change 
R.LIDS.1141 CANDIDATE Heater Operation - 
Blind Mode ACCEPTED 
The iLIDS shall provideperform The blind mode heater operation is to maintain the iLIDS 
within the thermal survivability range when being stored 
or displaced.  The iLIDS heater controller will have 
default values preprogrammed into the controller.  If the 
controller starts up with no communications, it will use 
the internal default values for set points.  If the controller 
is operating normally and then loses communications, 
the last heater set points received will be used until 
another communications message is received or the 
heater controller is power-cycled. 
 default heater 
operation when communications to the iLIDS 
heater controller is not available. 
Minor – 
Status 
Change 
R.LIDS.1142 CANDIDATE IDSS IDD 
Compatibility 
The iLIDS shall be compatible with the IDSS 
IDD Rev A. 
New The IDSS IDD establishes standards for compatibility 
across all docking system designs such that they are 
capable of interfacing and safely docking with one 
another.  The iLIDS design is based on docking 
interface features and loads specified in the NDS IDD 
that are also compatible with those specified in the IDSS 
IDD. 
R.LIDS.5003 ACCEPTED iLIDS Volume and 
Keep Out Zones 
(KOZ) 
The iLIDS envelope shall be in accordance 
with JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS Cross 
Section. 
The figure defines the static and dynamic envelopes that 
the iLIDS must adhere to for host vehicle integrations 
and operations.  The figure also establishes an EVA 
KOZ that is used for the exclusion of EVA requirements. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.5012 ACCEPTED SCS Ring Dimensions The iLIDS SCS dimensions shall be in 
accordance with JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure 
SCS Guide Petal System Profile. 
The iLIDS is NASA's implementation for the emerging 
International Docking System Standard (IDSS) using low 
impact docking technology.  The figure also identifies 
mechanical latch striker mounting holes, which provide 
scarring for future implementation of a mechanical latch 
striker interface. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.5014 ACCEPTED Pre-Capture SCS 
Compressive Force 
Resistance 
The iLIDS soft capture interface shall have no 
more than 56 lb compressive force resistance 
during capture. 
The low impact technology SCS requires minimal 
compressive force resistance across the interface prior 
to capture.  In order to achieve soft captureTo maximize 
the benefit of low impact technology, a maximum of 
1012 lb compressive force resistance is allowed across 
the interface.  This means each side is allowed to have 
a maximum of 56 lb resistance.  This resistance might 
include magnet strikers compliance 
mechanismmechanisms
Minor 
, the SCS capture sensors, and 
any other sources of compressive force resistance. 
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R.LIDS.5030 ACCEPTED iLIDS-to-Host Vehicle 
Electrical and Signal 
Interface 
To Be 
Deleted 
The iLIDS-to-vehicle functions shall be in 
accordance with the electrical interface 
between the iLIDS and the host vehicle as 
defined in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS-
to-Host Vehicle Electrical Interface. 
The IDD figure defines all the required host interfaces 
for both power and communication to the iLIDS as well 
as power and data transfer through iLIDS. 
Major - 
Deleted 
R.LIDS.5034 ACCEPTED Heater Power and 
Control 
The iLIDS shall provide redundant heater 
control for two channels. 
Only one channel is activeactively controlling a heater 
zone at a time while the other channel is in 
standby.powered and processing data (e.g., checking 
Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTDs), sending 
H&S, etc.) ready to actively control the heater zone if the 
other channel fails.
Minor 
  Refer to JSC-64599, Electric Power 
Quality Description Document for heater power 
timelines. 
R.LIDS.5036 ACCEPTED iLIDS-to-Host Vehicle 
Electrical Interface 
(excludingExcluding
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall provide 
electrical connections to the host vehicle as 
defined in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS 
(excluding -302) Tunnel Connections-to-Host 
Vehicle Electrical Interface. 
 -
302) 
The vehicle interface has a separate connector for 
power and data, unlike the iLIDS umbilical interface, 
which combines power and data. 
Minor 
R.LIDS.5038 CANDIDATE iLIDS Box 
Connections-to-Host 
Vehicle Electrical 
Interface (Excluding -
302) 
The iLIDS (excluding -302) shall provide 
electrical connections to the host vehicle as 
defined in JSC-65795, NDS IDD, figure NDS 
(excluding -302) Box Connections-to-Host 
Vehicle Electrical Interface. 
New The IDD figure defines the required host interfaces for 
both power and data to the iLIDS electrical boxes. 
R.LIDS.5061 CANDIDATE Maximum 
Temperature 
Differential for SCS 
Mating Interfaces 
ACCEPTED 
The iLIDS-SCS to iLIDS-SCS shall have a 
maximum allowable temperature differential of 
100 °F (56 °C) for soft capture. 
This restriction is based on thermal expansion limits for 
the engagement of the mating guide petals in the mating 
iLIDS. 
Minor - 
Status 
Change 
 
Table C-6 - iLIDS JPR 8080.5 Compliance Requirements Revision From/To Comparison 
The "From/To" table contains red colored text for omissions, blue for new or replaced text, and black for no changes.  
Strike-through text means the requirement is deleted.  The table reflects only items that have been modified between 
revisions.   
  
Standard Section Section Title Applicability Comments/Rationale Requirements 
JPR 8080.5 P-1 Pyrotechnic Devices - 
Arming and Disarming 
Not  Applicable   iLIDS design does not have the capability to arm or 
disarm pyros. 
 
